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ABSTRACT 
 
Traditional wisdom suggests those who lose at trial for a criminal charge receive a 
heftier prison sentence than those who plea bargain.  Plea bargaining reduces strain on 
the courts, expedites adjudication and may indicate the defendant’s propensity for 
rehabilitation as they accept responsibility for their actions.  Some ask why two people 
charged with the same crime should receive different sentences based on the adjudication 
method.  The Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial.  Innocent defendants may 
decide to plead guilty for a sure short sentence rather than risk a trial conviction’s 
lengthier one.  This study using statistical procedures examined 12,786 adjudicated drug 
crime cases between 2004 and 2007 from the Cook County Circuit Court in Illinois.  It 
sought to determine if adjudication method, plea bargain vs. trial conviction, predicted 
prison sentence while controlling for independent variables such as ethnicity, gender, 
statute violated, offense seriousness, quantity and interaction effects.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
For years, criminal justice experts have debated the existence of a trial tax with 
regards to sentencing.  Many believe that in the case of two defendants charged with the 
same offense, all other conditions being equal, if one pleads guilty and the other goes to 
trial and is found guilty, the latter will receive a stiffer sentence than the former.  Ulmer 
and Bradley (2006) define trial tax as occurring when, “. . . defendants are substantially 
penalized if they exercise their right to a jury trial and then lose.”  Bogira (2005) defines 
trial tax as, “. . . the extra punishment a defendant may face merely by virtue of 
exercising his right to trial.” 
The term trial tax has even found its way into official court publications.  Illinois 
appellate courts have acknowledged its existence.  The Alabama Sentencing Commission 
has debated its constitutionality.  Bogira (2005) claims the use of trial tax for means of 
judicial efficiency declaring, “A guilty plea can be wrapped up in approximately 20 
minutes, where a jury trial usually takes anywhere from two days to a week.” 
 Does the trial tax actually exist?  Controlling for other factors, are defendants who 
plead guilty more likely to receive leniency than those who go to trial?  Among offenders 
who plead guilty or go to trial for a drug offense, does a disparity exist in their sentences?  
Assuming we find a disparity, does it remain if we control for other variables such as 
specific crimes, offense severity, ethnicity or gender? 
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This study will examine adjudication data from the Circuit Court of Cook County.  
The arrest, charge and disposition records of almost 13,000 defendants adjudicated for 
drug related offenses will be analyzed.  Statistical analyses will be run to check for 
differences between groups based on the above noted variables. 
 The results of this dissertation may be used for policy development related to the 
alleged penalization of the constitutional right to a jury trial.  It may also serve as the 
foundation for a future, more encompassing study of the same topic – perhaps Illinois 
wide or including other states.  This project will be performed in conjunction with and 
receive assistance from the Institute for Metropolitan Affairs, a public policy institute 
operating within Roosevelt University.
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The primary issue for this research relates to whether a trial tax exists, or not.  
Anecdotal evidence supports the notion that, everything else being equal, those who 
plead guilty for crime x will receive a lighter sentence than those who got to trial and are 
then convicted of crime x, hence the term trial tax.  The defendant is enticed to accept the 
pact – plead guilty and receive a great bargain, hence, plea bargain.  However, if the 
criminally charged all have a constitutional right to trial why should they be penalized for 
exercising that right versus accepting a plea bargain?  This dissertation will examine the 
difference, if any, between convicts who went to trial to those who plea bargained.  The 
importance of this dissertation lies with the question of disparity in sentencing between 
trial and plea bargain convicts.  If no inequality is found, the concerns over the use of a 
trial tax disappear.  If those who plea bargain receive a statistically significant lesser 
sentence, however, then innocents may be far more likely to plead guilty to avoid a 
lengthy prison term.  Plea bargaining becomes a way of trading the risk of a ten year 
sentence for the certainty of three to five, regardless of guilt.  We will see the risk-
reduction theme run throughout this literature review. 
The oldest recorded use of a form of plea bargaining involves Galileo, the 15th 
century Italian astronomer.  In 1633, he avoided death via the Inquisition by pleading 
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guilty to supporting Copernicus’ heliocentric theory and agreeing to publicly deny said 
theory.  The judges gave him house arrest and he agreed to recite weekly, penitent 
psalms, which was a better deal than being burned alive.  While far removed from 
modern American courts, we see the seeds of the notion that pleading guilty upfront 
results in a lighter punishment. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court declared plea bargaining to be a legitimate legal tool via 
two landmark cases, Brady vs. United States and Santobello vs. United States.  In Brady, 
the Court noted that a plea helped hold down costs and expedited the judicial docket.  In 
the same case it declared that defendants were entitled to “limiting the probable penalty” 
by pleading guilty.  In Santobello, the Court asserted this acceptance of responsibility 
indicated a better chance for rehabilitation and should therefore be encouraged.  
However, there is no research cited in the case supporting this conclusion.  Neither case, 
however, discussed the constitutional propriety of how large the disparity in sentences 
may be, using plea bargains when the prosecution’s case was weak or “bargaining down” 
to a lesser charge.  In a sweeping 1969 decision, Boykin vs. Alabama, the Court declared 
that Constitutional right to a jury trial may be waived only if the defendant voluntarily 
accepted said plea bargain.  Boykin, represented by a public defender, never formally, 
with his own words, accepted a plea bargain for the five robbery charges against him.  He 
and his attorney remained silent while the prosecution presented the plea.  The trial judge 
simply entered the plea without asking Boykin if he understood and accepted it.  The 
Court reversed the conviction even though Boykin’s attorney did not object to the plea. 
Bargaining “down” came into being as a result of sentence guidelines and 
mandatory minimums.  According to Kinsley (2002) with sentencing discretion limited or 
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removed entirely by the mandatory minimums, prosecutors found it necessary to allow 
defendants to plea to a lesser charge in order to get the lesser sentence.  He notes that 
many have argued that when a guilty person plea bargains to a lesser charge, it permits 
the defendant to escape the legal consequences of their crimes.  If they go to trial and are 
convicted, they will be sentenced according the actual crime committed, not a less serious 
offence.  The flip-side of this action is those charged, but innocent, may plead guilty 
simply to avoid the continued trauma associated with a criminal charge or to avoid or 
limit a prison term. 
We must study plea bargains because of their extensive use and potential for 
abuse.  Kinsley (2002) reports that 95% of all criminal cases in the United States are 
settled by plea bargain.   
And when, as part of a plea bargain, innocent people confess to a crime 
they did not commit, that isn't a breakdown of the system. It is the system 
working exactly as it is supposed to. If you're the suspect, sometimes this 
means agreeing with the prosecutor that you will confess to jaywalking 
when you're really guilty of armed robbery. 
 
Fisher (2003) quotes University of Chicago law professor Albert Alschuler as 
declaring the rate to be around 90%.   The King (2005) study, discussed in this review, 
places the figure at around 98%.  While precise figures are not available, legal experts 
agree that the vast majority of criminal cases are settled by the use of plea bargaining.   
 Per Fisher (2003), the earliest use of plea bargains in the United States is found in 
the late 18th century, Middlesex County, Massachusetts.  He found strikingly similar 
elements to what we hear today – overburdened and underfunded courts, lack of judicial 
and law enforcement resources, and those with a sufficient “purse” being able to hire the 
best lawyers.  In addition, these early plea bargains came from criminal charges against 
6 
 
victimless crimes such as selling or drinking alcohol.  “The Middlesex County prosecutor 
devised a system whereby multiple charges for selling liquor without a license would be 
dropped to one charge, to which defendants would plead nollo contendere [no contest] 
and be sentenced to a pre-determined fine and court costs.”  Critics of the modern war on 
drugs would no doubt sympathize with their 18th century counterpart critics. 
 Fisher (2003) claims that by 1900 the criticism of what we today call a trial tax 
had taken root as the severity of a trial sentence ranged from twice to three times as long 
as those handed down after a plea bargain for the same crime.  Does the trial tax exist?  If 
so, does this disparity affect one group, such as ethnicity or gender, more than another?  
What types of formal research have been conducted to date? 
 Langer (2006) dealt solely with the improper use of plea bargains by prosecutors 
in terms of violating jurisdictional penal codes covering plea bargain rules and 
procedures.  Langer performed qualitative, document analysis research by studying 
landmark cases, state and federal, in which Constitutional issues of lack of due process, 
as it relates to prosecutorial discretion, was the dominant if not sole ground for the case.  
He categorized the rights violations into four groups: Right to a Hearing and Knowing the 
Evidence, Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, Right Against Self-incrimination and the 
Right to an Impartial Adjudicator. 
Langer (2006) coined terms for two primary categories of defendants being 
denied due process via a prosecutor’s authority.  He refers to the “de facto unilateral 
adjudication” in which prosecutors, effectively, solely decide guilt or innocence via 
coercive plea proposals.  As prosecutors decide charges, and in effect sentences if found 
guilty, the sentence differential often leaves the accused with no reasonable choice other 
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than to accept guilt.  In addition, he describes what he labeled “de facto bilateral 
adjudication” where both prosecution and defense sidestep the courts to adjudicate by 
mutual consent.  Langer argues that the former violates our fundamental due process 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.  However, as previously noted, the U.S. Supreme 
Court sanctioned the waiving of Constitutional rights via Boykin vs. Alabama, if the 
accused voluntarily accepts the plea bargain. 
By threatening to take cases to trial where no reasonable jury would find guilt or 
charging defendants (guilty or not) with crimes that do not reflect the incident in 
question, prosecutors have created what Langer (2006) calls the informal prosecutorial 
adjudication system.  The quintessential example remains sexual assault versus assault.  
A prosecutor has virtually no case against a defendant charged with rape.  He offers to 
reduce the charge to assault with a sentence of probation if the accused pleads guilty.  
Granted, prosecutors cannot force a defendant to accept said plea bargain but this does 
not change the adjudicatory nature of this arrangement.  Once again, however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has authorized the process by the case Brady vs. United States, actually 
stating that defendants were entitled to “limit the probable penalty.”  Regardless, this 
unchecked power of prosecutors, Langer asserts, has led to uncountable numbers of 
coercive plea bargains. 
Bibas (2004) examined the outcomes of plea bargaining in civil litigation and 
found results similar to Langer (2006).  We see again this notion of hedging a bet with 
regards to a result.  The defendant may truly owe $100,000 but the plaintiff, unwilling to 
risk a zero dollar judgment, accepts the $50,000.  Conversely, the defendant may owe 
nothing, but, fearing a large judgment, agrees to pay the smaller amount.  Similar to 
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Langer’s concerns over defacto bilateral adjudication, effectively, the attorneys decide 
the outcome without input from the judge or jury.   
Bibas (2004) provides a study filled with both actual and hypothetical cases for 
illustration.  Typical examples include a plaintiff claiming $100,000 in damages with a 
jury only 50% likely to find the defendant negligent.  Both parties should therefore settle 
for $50,000.  Similar to Langer (2006), Bibas used document analysis by reviewing high 
profile civil cases across the United States for his material.  He also interviewed attorneys 
from each side, plaintiff and defendant, asking non-case-specific questions about the 
process and how the parties ultimately settled. 
This study proved an interesting contrast to the criminal case related research 
addressed elsewhere.  Bibas (2004) makes little mention of Constitutional rights, loss of 
liberty or coercion by prosecutors.  While he does note similarities between criminal plea 
bargains and settling tort cases, he spends most of the research considering the similarity 
between the self-correcting market place and logic behind plea agreements similar to the 
above mentioned example.  While he reviews bargaining for the best financial bargain, 
the other studies dealt with bargaining over someone’s liberty. 
Bibas (2004) notes the similarities, such as plea bargaining being hidden from 
public view, to the criminal court’s use of plea bargains.  Be it neighbors feuding over a 
damaged lawn or a multi-billion dollar tort claim, as the discussion and settlement occurs 
outside of the courtroom the public will never know what transpired.  Unlike a criminal 
case, however, they will not even know the outcome.  In criminal cases, the sentence 
becomes public record regardless of the adjudication method.  In a civil case settled 
outside of court, only each party knows the outcome.  Another difference is that there are 
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no public defenders in the civil arena.  An indigent criminal defendant may receive a 
defense attorney, paid a straight salary, to represent 10 or 100 clients.  Clearly that 
attorney has personal incentive to plea bargain.  That scenario would not exist in a tort 
claim where counsel is paid via a retainer or even a percentage of recovered funds.  
Finkelstein (1975) found evidence of another unanticipated cost of plea 
bargaining, the “implicit rate of non-conviction” – the proportion of defendants pleading 
guilty who, in all probability, would have not been convicted in a trial.  The researcher 
determined this unobservable variable by creating a conviction probability.  If there exists 
two federal districts with the prosecutors from one always seeking maximum sentences 
and the other not doing so, logically, defendants in the first district are more likely to plea 
bargain than those in the second.  If every defendant pleading guilty would have been 
convicted at trial, it stands to reason that, over time, the proportion of acquittals between 
the two districts would be relatively equal.  If, however, the first district sees substantially 
fewer acquittals than the second, undoubtedly, some of the plea bargaining defendants in 
the first district would not have been convicted if they had gone to trial.  The study tested 
for a statistically significant correlation between the percentage of plea bargains and 
acquittal probabilities. 
The author says little about where he obtained the records or how he coded them.  
He does note that the data came from the Annual Reports of the Attorney General.  
Beyond that he notes two limitations to the study.  First, he did not control for the variety 
of criminal cases per district.  If one district’s docket saw a disproportionate amount of a 
particular type of crime, that may skew the results.  In addition, presumably those 
districts more apt to plea bargain, focused their resources on trials and were more likely 
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to obtain a conviction because they had the time and money to properly litigate.  His 
study dealt only with federal cases – the situation may be different in state criminal 
courts. 
 Using the Annual Reports of the Attorney General from the twenty-nine federal 
district courts, Finkelstein (1975) found a statistically significant, strong negative 
correlation between the percentage of non-convictions (the defendant would probably 
have been acquitted if they went to trial) to the percentage of guilty pleas.  It should be 
noted that the data in each district was analyzed in the aggregate to provide for a larger 
sample and greater stability.  The data points do not make a perfect line.  This could be 
interpreted as indicating that the non-conviction rate is influenced by variables other than 
plea bargain rates.  However, the correlation equaled -0.849.  Using the least squares 
technique produced a -0.691 slope indicating a non-conviction rate of about 69%.  
Finkelstein calls this evidence that, “. . . pressures to plead guilty have been used to 
secure convictions that could not otherwise be obtained.” (Finkelstein, p. 309) 
 Finkelstein (1975) comments on Boykin vs. Alabama, where the U.S. Supreme 
Court said a defendant may waive his right to a jury trial only if it is done so voluntarily.  
He notes that while the Court approved this practice, it did so, “. . . only on the 
assumption that defendants who were convicted on the basis of negotiated pleas of guilt 
would have been convicted had they elected to stand trial.” (Finkelstein, p. 293)  The 
above data seems to refute that point.  Finkelstein goes on to note the temptation 
defendants, undoubtedly some innocent, must feel to accept a plea – again, we see 
evidence of bet hedging.  The accused accepts a lower sentence in exchange for avoiding 
a possible, long sentence.  He notes, “. . . prosecutors may be using threats of lengthy 
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sentences and other plea inducing practices to obtain convictions in case in which the 
government’s evidence is quite insubstantial.” (Finkelstein, p. 293) 
Moreover, Finkelstein (1975) argues that, what Langer (2006) would call 
unilateral defacto adjudication, that is, the prosecutor coercing a plea bargain, negates 
Boykin vs. Alabama in that, “. . . when strong pressure is necessary to compel a 
confession in a weak case, the prosecutor’s zeal to obtain a conviction by “consent” 
begins to collide with the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.”  (Finkelstein, 
p. 294)  Finkelstein also agrees with Langer’s assessment in that, “It appears that 
informal, and less visible, administrative practices have been used to induce convictions 
by “consent” in a significant number of cases in which the protections of the formal 
system would have precluded a condemnation.” (Finkelstein, p. 311) 
The Finkelstein data analysis for the 1908 to 1928 period found a statistically 
significant correlation of -0.812.  The correlation value is similar to the 1970 – 1974 
dataset, but, the slope of the least squares line equaled -0.265 meaning that the non-
conviction rate equaled about 26.5%.  This slope is only 38% of the value of the first 
dataset indicating that while plea bargains resulted in the conviction of those who may 
otherwise have been acquitted, the impact was not as great for that time frame.  The 1954 
– 1974 dataset revealed a striking correlation of -0.977 with a slope of least squares equal 
to -0.791 which is higher than the percentage for 1970 – 1974. 
 It should be noted that Finkelstein (1975) does agree with a comment from Brady 
vs. United States with regards to plea bargains expediting the court docket and saving 
funds.  He wrote, “If insistence on a trial cost nothing, presumably few of the accused 
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would plead guilty and forgo the chance for a dismissal or acquittal.” (Finkelstein, p. 
293) 
 The Finkelstein (1975) study offers compelling evidence that many who plead 
guilty may actually have been acquitted at trial.  Of course, acquittal does not mean they 
are innocent.  Perhaps the guilty received a deserved conviction; perhaps some innocent 
people bent to the pressure of a prosecutor.  The next step would be to determine if a 
disparity truly exists for sentencing of plea bargained defendants and those who go to 
trial. 
 Ulmer and Bradley (2006) focus on violent crimes and the practice of plea 
bargaining.  They did this because violent crime charges are more than twice as likely to 
go to trial, roughly 7%, versus 3% overall, in Pennsylvania.  As previously noted by 
Fisher (2003), King (2005) and Kinsley (2002), the vast majority of charges are settled by 
plea bargains.   
Using data from 1997 to 2000 from the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing 
(PCS), their study tested eight hypotheses, two of which mirrored the research in this 
dissertation.  One hypothesis declared, “Among convicted defendants, those convicted by 
jury trial will be sentenced more severely than those convicted by guilty plea” (Ulmer & 
Bradley, 2006, p. 637).  Another sought to test whether or not, “The jury trial penalty . . . 
will be significantly greater among those with more extensive prior criminal records” 
(Ulmer & Bradley, p. 639).  The other hypotheses dealt with influence of course 
caseloads on plea bargaining and issues related to violent crimes, neither of which will 
play a part in this research. 
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 Ulmer & Bradley (2006) used sentence length as the dependent variable, coded as 
probation or incarceration with the number of months and offense severity, prior record, 
plea bargain and trial (bench or jury) as the independent variables.  Their large dataset of 
n = 8,585 allowed for the employment of Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) to create 
predictor models and search for group variations using separate but interrelated units of 
analysis.  Level 1, individual case / defendant, characteristics were nested and could 
interact with Level 2, county courts, individual and cross-county (statewide) outcomes, 
that is, the sentence length. 
The authors admitted several limitations to their study, such as not measuring 
variables such as the socio-economic status of the subjects, whether they had public or 
private defense attorneys, victim characteristics (assuming harsher sentences if a child, 
female or elderly person fell target) or pretrial release status.  Ulmer and Bradley (2006) 
noted that individuals held in jail, awaiting adjudication, often did not serve prison time.  
That is, if someone cannot afford or does not receive bail and they remain in jail for a 
significant period of time, if they would have received a sentence of X months, the judge 
could simply release them with time served.  While that time would count towards the 
sentence if the defendant were sentenced to additional time, it does not appear in the 
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing dataset as incarceration time.  Obviously, the 
fact that they studied data from only one state limits the results. 
 The results of this study support the existence of a trial tax.   Ulmer and Bradley 
(2006) found that, “. . . the odds of incarceration following a bench trial are roughly 2.2 
times the odds for guilty plea, while a jury trial conviction has roughly 2.7 times the 
incarceration odds of a guilty plea” (Ulmer & Bradley, p. 650).  They concluded that, 
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“Overall, then, conviction by trial, especially jury trial, carries a meaningful additional 
sentencing penalty . . .” (Ulmer & Bradley, p. 650). 
 The results of this study do support the hypothesis that criminal history plays a 
role in the sentence depending on whether or not the defendant pleas or goes to trial; 
however, not in the correlation one might expect.  Ulmer and Bradley (2006) determined 
that, “. . . the jury trial penalty decreases as the prior record score of the defendant 
increases” (Ulmer & Bradley, p. 653).  The authors ran separate HLM models to compare 
jury trial sentencing results for subjects with high criminal record scores to those with 
low criminal record scores.  The authors found that the difference between having many 
prior convictions and going to trial or not was not statistically significant in terms of the 
odds of incarceration.  However, subjects with low criminal record scores had 3.5 times 
the probability of incarceration if they had chosen a trial vs. plea bargain.  Oddly, the jury 
trial tax seemed heavier for subjects with less criminal histories than those with an 
extensive record. 
 Agreeing with Finkelstein (1975) and Brady vs. United States, the authors note 
that, “Most researchers argue that rewarding those who plead guilty and penalizing those 
who lose at trial reflects the need for efficiency in case processing.” (Ulmer & Bradley, 
2006, p. 635)  However, unlike Finkelstein, the authors offer support for this scenario in 
that, “Rewarding those who plead guilty with lighter sentences is widely seen as 
necessary to encourage defendants’ ‘remorse,’ ‘acceptance of responsibility’ for crimes . . 
. losing [at trial] may signal a defendant’s lack of remorse, and therefore greater 
blameworthiness, to judges.” (Ulmer & Bradley, p. 636)  Similar to Santobello vs. United 
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States, accepting responsibility may be evidence of a better chance of rehabilitation, thus, 
the lighter sentence. 
 Johnson (2003) used the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing (PCS) data to 
focus on departures from sentencing guidelines, not the complete sentence itself, and then 
looked for differences between groups, depending on the type of conviction.  A 
departure, in criminal sentencing terminology, refers to an allowed increase or decrease 
in a sentence range established by guidelines or a sentence set by statute.  For example, if 
a guideline calls for a minimum sentence of x months for a crime, the judge may be 
allowed to assign a downward departure of y months for showing remorse and 
acceptance of responsibility.  That defendant’s sentence would then be x – y months.  Or, 
if the maximum sentence for some crime equaled x months, but the convicted person 
acted as ring-leader, the judge may be allowed to assign an upward departure of y 
months.  The sentence then becomes x + y months. 
 The author used PCS data from 1996 – 1998 to examine the likelihood of 
receiving a sentence that departs from the guidelines.  He then searched for disparities 
based on conviction modes and ethnicity.  The author defined the four modes as non-
negotiated pleas where the accused pleads guilty without discussion, negotiated pleas 
where the defense and prosecution negotiated a plea agreement, bench trials where the 
case was tried by the judge and jury trials where a panel of jurors decided to convict or 
not. 
 The researcher formed six hypotheses.  The first sought to test the question of 
sentence outcome disparity based on ethnicity.  The second focused on sentence disparity 
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for those who went to trial (regardless of type) to those who plead guilty (regardless of 
type).  For analysis he compared downward departure vs. standard sentence with n = 
45,594 and upward departure vs. standard sentence with n = 109,931.  Thus, the 
dependent variable model used a tri-variable that distinguished the sentences as having a 
downward departure, no departure (standard sentence) and upward departure.  The 
independent variables were the aforementioned modes of conviction.  There were a small 
number of cases in the dataset listed as “other” or “no contest” but these were not 
included due to the small number of occurrences.  The seriousness of the offense was 
controlled by using an Offense Gravity Score (OGS) and Prior Record Score (PRS).  The 
OGS measures the seriousness of the offense on a scale of one to thirteen, one being least 
serious and thirteen being the most.  The PRS measures the prior criminality of the 
defendant by considering the number and severity of past convictions on a scale of one to 
eight, one being “least criminality” and eight being “most criminality” such as repeat, 
violent offenders. 
 Johnson (2003) found that overall, Blacks had a 25% less chance of receiving a 
downward departure than whites and Hispanics were 56% less likely than whites to 
receive this benefit.  In addition, older and female offenders, regardless of ethnicity, were 
more likely to receive a downward departure than their younger counterparts. 
 Criminal history also affected the sentence to differing degrees, based on the 
mode of conviction.  An increase in criminal history of five units (on the PRS scale) 
increased the odds of a downward departure by 1.72 overall, while a non-negotiated plea 
multiplied the odds by 3.69.  Regardless, as with Ulmer and Bradley (2006), those with 
more criminal experience were more likely to receive a shorter sentence. 
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 The results for conviction modes revealed the following.  Conviction by jury trial 
increased the chances of an upward departure by 85%, while a negotiated plea bargain 
decreased the odds of an upward departure by only 20%.  Conviction at a bench trial 
decreased the odds of an upward departure by 56%, while conviction at a jury trial 
decreased said odds by 62%.  In summary, “For downward departure decisions, 
negotiating a plea increased the likelihood of departure, while going to bench or jury trial 
decreased the likelihood.”  (Johnson, 2003, p. 480)  In addition, “For upward departure 
decisions, negotiating a plea reduced the likelihood of departure while going to jury trial 
increased it.” (Johnson, p. 480)   However, this finding did not hold true for bench trials 
in the upward analysis.  The author suggested examining this curiosity in future research. 
 While Bibas (2004) noted that in civil cases settled by consent no documentation 
exists for the settlement, Johnson (2003) declared that no formal research had been 
performed on the prosecutor as an “actor” in the courtroom setting with regards to plea 
bargaining.  He stated that while convictions and sentences became part of the court 
record, the actual bargaining done by prosecutor and defense attorney was not recorded 
and, thereby, subject to scrutiny.  He also concurred with Langer’s (2006) unilateral and 
bilateral defacto adjudication theory in that, “Because prosecutors utilize their own 
judgment when negotiating sentencing recommendations in exchange for guilty pleas, 
and because judges almost always adhere to these recommendations, prosecutors exercise 
more sentencing discretion than judges for these cases.” (Johnson, p. 456) 
 Via the likelihood of receiving a downward departure, or not, Johnson (2003) 
found evidence of the trial tax’s existence.  Unlike Langer (2006), Bibas (2004) and 
Finkelstein (1975), he did not comment on the implications such as pleading for risk 
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reduction or the possibility of innocents pleading guilty due to prosecutorial coercion.  
Johnson provided a straightforward, quantitative project on upward and downward 
departure disparities. 
King (2005) directly studies the disparity between trial and plea bargain 
sentencing, primarily focusing on the impact of sentencing guidelines and the variation 
that still exists, even within jurisdictions, for sentences, period.  King notes that for years 
reformers have attempted to regulate sentence disparity for like offenders on legal issues 
to eliminate the disparity for non-legal factors such as ethnicity or gender.  Her research 
focused on what she termed “process discounts”, sentence differences for the same 
offense whether conviction occurred by trail (jury or bench) or plea bargain, in five states 
using sentencing guidelines.  As a point of interest, she notes that only the federal 
criminal justice system, via the U.S. Sentencing Commission, acknowledges the plea 
bargain sentence discount for “acceptance of responsibility”.  Similar to Ulmer & 
Bradley (2006), she notes that pleading guilty may be evidence of the defendant’s 
reduced likelihood to be a repeat offender and, as such, should be rewarded with a lighter 
sentence.  She also declares that no state sentencing guidelines formally recognize plea 
bargains. 
To collect data, King (2005) used a mixed-methods approach by obtaining 
archival sentencing data and conducting a series of telephone interviews with prosecutors 
and defense attorneys from Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and Washington.  
These states were selected as they had established judicial sentencing guidelines, a 
sizeable number of bench trials and available data.  Her study hypothesized that, 
controlling for other factors, sentences for the same crime would be most severe for jury 
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trials, then bench trials, then plea bargains, respectively.  Some reasons for sentence 
disparity remain fundamental.  Typically, a direct correlation exists between the number 
of past convictions and sentence severity for the most recent crime.  Other potential 
reasons remain overtly improper – ethnicity being the prime example. 
The interviews revealed some expected results with regards to the prosecutors’ 
and defense attorneys’ perceptions.  Almost every subject agreed with the idea that a jury 
trial yields the harshest sentence, plea bargain yields softest sentence and that a bench 
trial produces a “middle” sentence model.  They all agreed that the primary impetus for 
plea bargaining is to provide an incentive to avoid costly, for the courts, trials.  
Unexpected information arose as well, however.  King (2005) noted that some factors, 
relating to higher sentences for trial convictions cannot be controlled for, such as a 
judge’s emotional reaction to victim testimony, public scrutiny that accompanies trials, or 
the “human” perspective of the judge that going to trail demonstrates an inherent lack of 
remorse on the defendant’s part. 
Of the five states studied, only Washington failed to show a statistically 
significant difference that mirrored the predicted model.  The other four, to varying 
degrees, offer substantial sentence “discounts” to defendants who plead guilty over those 
who go to trial.  Those who do not plead guilty but accept a bench trial fare only slightly 
better, on average, than those who choose a jury trial.  King (2005) found, “. . . a 
significant plea discount – the difference between the average sentence given after a 
guilty verdict and the average sentence given after a guilty plea for the same offense . . . 
but waiving a jury in favor of a bench trial has less consistent punishment consequences.” 
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King (2005), just as do Langer (2006) and Johnson (2003), notes the one-way 
street often associated with prosecutor offered plea bargains to reduce the sentence by 
pleading to a less severe crime.  She notes that, “. . . prosecutorial discretion in charging, 
which produces vast differences in the punishment of similarly situated offenders, even 
where sentencing guidelines limit sentence disparity per charge (King, p. 960).” 
Plea bargaining began as a means to lessen the burden on courts.  In 1970 the U.S. 
Supreme Court declared, via Brady vs. United States, that plea bargains reduce the 
expense of running courts and speed up the dockets.  After all, if the prosecution’s case is 
so strong why bother with a trial if the defendant waives that right?  By Boykin vs. 
Alabama, the Court asserted that those charged may indeed waive Constitutional rights, 
so long as it is done voluntarily.  However, Langer (2006) noted the appearance of de 
facto adjudication where prosecutors effectively become the judge and jury by coercive 
or enticing plea offers.  Langer felt this violated the fundamental right to due process.  
The U.S. Supreme Court suggested that this willingness to accept responsibility for a 
crime may indicate a better chance at rehabilitation.  A decision by the Court in 1971, 
Santobello vs. United States, indicated that accepting a plea bargain may be a good sign 
that a defendant was ready to be reformed. 
Like many good ideas, however, it seems to have had unintended consequences.  
Fisher (2003), King (2005) and Kinsley (2002) all state that less than 10% of all 
convictions are the result of a trial.  To avoid the chance of prison, i.e. avoid the risk, 
innocents may plead guilty.  While this is bad enough, it also means the guilty party 
remains free.  However, in Brady vs. United States, the Court openly acknowledges that 
plea bargains “limit the probability of penalty”.  Both Langer (2006) and Bibas (2004) 
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detail the enticement of hedging bets in terms of a consequence.  Langer notes the 
injustice to the victims via examples such as a sexual assault charge being changed to 
simple assault.  Here we see how prosecutors circumnavigate minimum sentencing laws 
– to entice the rapist to plea bargain; in order to guarantee a shorter sentence, the 
prosecutor reduces the charges.  Here we see his de facto adjudication in play.  If truly 
guilty, why should the convict get a bargain with a reduced charge and/or sentence?  If 
the Constitution guarantees a jury trial, should the accused be penalized if convicted, via 
sentence, for exercising that right? 
The primary question of whether or not plea bargains result in statistically 
significant different sentences compared to those who are convicted at trial will be 
studied.  We have seen how Fisher (2003) declares the trial tax to be as much as two to 
three times the sentence compared to plea bargaining.  Finkelstein (1975) found an 
implicit rate of non-conviction of 69% - that is, per his data, 69% of those who plead 
guilty probably would have not been convicted by a jury.  Ulmer & Bradley (2006) found 
that a jury trial has 2.7 times the chance of resulting in incarceration than a plea bargain.  
Johnson (2003) stated that a jury trial conviction increased the chances of an upward 
sentence departure by 85%, while plea bargaining actually decreased the odds of getting 
an upward departure by 20%.  Four out of five states studied by King (2005) found a 
statistically significant increase in sentences for those going to trail compared to those 
who plea bargained. 
This dissertation will focus on drug crimes committed in Cook County, Illinois 
and whether or not those who went to trial and were found guilty received a harsher 
sentence than those who accepted a plea bargain.  While the sentence received will serve 
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as the dependent variable, numerous independent variables will be controlled for to look 
for differences.  Based on analysis performed by studies noted in this literature review, 
the key independent variables seem to be trial vs. plea bargain, specific offense, offense 
severity, ethnicity and gender.  Unfortunately, the dataset to be received from the Circuit 
Court of Cook County will not contain information regarding the defendant’s criminal 
history.  As such, that variable will not be considered in this study. 
The specific crime as defined by Illinois statute, gender, ethnicity and offense 
severity will be employed to search for differences between groups.  We must study these 
variables to search for disparity in sentencing based on what group a subject may belong.  
This may suggest discrimination and point out the need for future research. 
This can only be accomplished by knowing the statute a defendant has been 
charged with violating.  The scope of this study will be limited to the twenty-five drug 
statutes found in Table 2.  The inclusion of initial charge and amended charge will reveal 
if a defendant has “plead down” to a lesser charge or simply plead guilty to the initial 
crime with which he had been charged.  For example, a defendant may have an initial 
charge of violating statute 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (1) (B), 100 – 399 grams of heroin.  If 
the record shows an amended charge of violating statute 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (1) (A), 
15 – 99 grams of heroin, and a plea bargain, this indicates a plea down to a lesser charge 
to receive a lighter sentence. 
 The groups, in aggregate, will be those convicted by plea bargain and those 
convicted by jury trial.  However, these groups may be analyzed further by the specific 
offense, the offense severity, gender and ethnicity.  For example, a statistically significant 
difference may or may not exist for the whole sample, but, the study will investigate for 
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differences between genders, ethnicity, etc.  A sub-question may be to investigate 
whether those convicted of a specific crime, plead guilty, received a statistically 
significant difference in sentence based on gender, ethnicity, etc. 
From 1980 to 2005, the U.S. prison population increased six-fold from 250,000 to 
1,500,000 inmates.  In 2006, the most recent year for which Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics are available, over 7,000,000 Americans, about 2.5%, were 
under some form of correctional supervision such as incarceration, jail (awaiting 
adjudication), probation or parole.  Approximately 70% were convicted of a drug related 
crime.  By the end of 2006, the female inmate population, state and federal, increased 
2.6% from 2005 while the male population increased by 1.9%.  Females made up 7% of 
all U.S. inmates.  African-American females were twice as likely as Hispanic females, 
and three times as likely as White females, to be incarcerated. 
One possible use of the results of this research might be to determine an eligible 
pool for implementation of a statewide treatment plan alternative to incarceration.  At this 
time, the Cook County State’s Attorney maintains that the majority of those convicted of 
drug possession have accepted plea agreements from sales offenses.  In order to 
determine the potential cost savings of treatment for those charged with drug possession 
offenses and incarcerated for these offenses, analysis of plea bargaining is required.  
This research will be a part of Drug Possession Impact Study by the Institute for 
Metropolitan Affairs scheduled for a late 2010 publication.  It will study the criminal 
justice system’s changing impact on Chicago’s non-violent drug offenders in a 
comprehensive, systematic manner to create research-informed policies for increased, 
adequate and appropriate drug treatment.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
The primary issue for this research relates to whether a trial tax exists for 
defendants charged with drug crimes in Cook County, Illinois.  Finkelstein (1975), 
Johnson (2003), King (2005), Langer (2006) and Ulmer and Bradley (2006) all declared 
that everything else being equal, those who plead guilty of a certain crime will receive a 
lighter sentence than those who got to trial and are convicted of the same crime; hence 
the term trial tax. 
Does the trial tax exist in Cook County – that is, are defendants who plead guilty 
more likely to receive leniency than those convicted at trial?  Assuming a disparity is 
discovered, does it remain when controlling for other variables such as offense type, 
offense severity, ethnicity or gender? 
Data Description 
 This study examined adjudication data from the Circuit Court of Cook County, 
Illinois.  The charge and disposition records of almost 13,000 defendants sentenced for 
drug related offenses were analyzed. 
 Data was requested, via the Freedom of Information Act, from the Cook County 
Circuit Court for drug-related offenses.  The court tracks adjudication, along with other 
identifiers, by Illinois Statute.  Subjects must have been charged between 2004 and 2006 
with final disposition occurring no later than 2007. 
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Data Permissions 
 All data obtained is publicly available through the Freedom of Information Act.  
Case numbers were used as identifiers for the adjudication data.  Names, social security 
numbers, driver’s license numbers or any other personal information were not part of the 
dataset.  There is no way to identify a specific individual with a specific case from the 
dataset short of going to a Cook County courthouse and requesting to see the file for a 
specific criminal case using the case number provided.  Such records, however, are public 
information.  Anyone may search criminal records by name or case number at any Cook 
County courthouse. 
 The investigation is limited to adjudication data. Adjudication data from the 
Circuit Court of Cook County is not comparable to Illinois Department of Corrections 
(IDOC) prisons admission data which represents anyone entering prison in a given year.  
Since violent offenders, for example, generally get longer sentences, they tend to 
represent more of the total prison population at any given time.  But since violent 
offenders are less common than drug offenders, they make up much less of the 
population entering prison at any point in time. 
Variables in Dataset  
 
Dependent Variables 
 
The single dependent variable studied was “sentence” – the amount of prison time 
an offender must serve for a crime.  Cook County judges sentence offenders to a 
minimum amount of time, expressed in months, to the custody of IDOC.  Occasionally 
judges also impose a maximum term.  Inmates are frequently released prior to the 
minimum sentence in accordance with IDOC regulations.  Illinois currently uses the “day 
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for a day” good behavior policy.  For every day of the sentence an inmate maintains good 
behavior, he or she gets one day reduction in their sentence.  In addition, if they are 
eligible for and complete substance abuse or vocational/employment training they may 
receive additional time off.  It would be impossible to track each convict’s actual 
incarceration time without comparing individual case numbers.  The IDOC often 
determines actual incarceration time, but for this study the judge’s minimum month 
sentence was used. 
Independent Variables 
 
 Independent variables were controlled for and used to predict the outcome, or 
dependent variable, sentence.  Sentences may vary by whether the defendant plea 
bargained or went to trial, the offense severity, ethnicity, gender and interaction effects.  
The following table lists the independent variables. 
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Table 1 
Independent Variables______________________ 
 
1. Conviction Mode – Jury Trial or Plea Bargain 
2. Gender 
3. Ethnicity 
4. Seriousness – Possession or Sales 
5. Quantity (<15g or ≥15g) 
7. Gender * Conviction Mode 
8. Ethnicity * Possession vs. Sales 
9. Ethnicity * Quantity 
______________________________________ 
 
Convictions and sentences were analyzed in the aggregate and then studied based 
on the violation of specific statute groups in an attempt to determine if one type of crime 
is more likely to yield a disparity in sentence based on a plea bargain or trial conviction.  
Severity was classified as possession vs. distribution and the quantity of narcotics 
involved.  For example, statutes 1 through 4 represent the sale of heroin in various 
quantities.  Statutes 16 through 19 represent the possession of cocaine in various 
quantities.  The following table lists statues by citation and description. 
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Table 2 
Statutes and Their Descriptions_____________________ 
 
Sales Crimes 
 
1. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (1) (A) Heroin, 15-99g 
2. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (1) (B) Heroin, 100-399g 
3. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (1) (C) Heroin, 400-899g 
4. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (1) (D) Heroin, 900+g 
5. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (2) (A) Cocaine, 15-99g           
6. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (2) (B) Cocaine, 100-399g 
7. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (2) (C) Cocaine, 400-899g 
8. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (2) (D) Cocaine, 900+g 
9. 720 ILCS 570/401 (c) (1) Heroin, 1-14 g 
10. 720 ILCS 570/401 (c) (2) Cocaine, 1-14 g 
11. 720 ILCS 570/401 (d) Heroin and Cocaine, < 1g 
_____________________________________________ 
 
Possession Crimes 
 
12. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (1) (A) Heroin, 15-99g 
13. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (1) (B) Heroin, 100-399g 
14. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (1) (C) Heroin, 400-899g 
15. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (1) (D) Heroin, 900+g 
16. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (2) (A) Cocaine, 15-99g 
17. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (2) (B) Cocaine, 100-399g 
18. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (2) (C) Cocaine, 400-899g 
19. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (2) (D) Cocaine, 900+g 
20. 720 ILCS 570/402 (c) Heroin and Cocaine, < 15g      
______________________________________________ 
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 The results of Johnson (2003), King (2005) and Ulmer and Bradley (2006) 
suggest that ethnicity plays a role in how the criminal justice system treats a defendant.  
In addition, according to The Sentencing Project, Blacks make up approximately 46% of 
the U.S. prison population while they account for only 13% of the U.S. population.  
Between 1994 and 2002, the mean sentence for Blacks convicted of drug crimes 
increased 73% compared to a 28% increase for White drug offenders.  Blacks serve 
almost as much time in prison for drug offenses, on average 57.2 months, as Whites do 
for violent offenses, about 58.8 months. 
Analyses Performed 
 The central research question associated with this study asks whether a 
statistically significant difference exists between the sentences of those convicted of a 
crime by plea bargain versus jury trial while controlling for background and context 
variables. 
Chi-square tests were performed to compare differences between groups such as 
ethnicity and gender in an attempt to determine whether or not these variables may be 
used to predict sentence across those groups.  Chi-square tests were run to check for 
sentence differences for those who plea bargained or lost at trial, based on gender and 
then ethnicity.  As with all analyses performed in this study, the two main groups were 
plea bargain and convicted at trial. 
 The chi-square test determines whether an association exists between two or more 
categorical variables.  With two categorical variables this results in a two-dimensional 
contingency table illustrating frequency and proportions; three categorical variables 
results in a 2 x 3 table as illustrated below. 
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 For example, a chi-square test of association may be run comparing the number of 
African Americans, Hispanics and Whites who plea bargained or were convicted at trial.  
Such a contingency table may appear as follows, with a through f representing frequency 
counts. 
Table 3 
Example of a Contingency Table      _________ 
 
      Conviction Mode 
 
Ethnicity    Plea Bargain   Trial Conviction  Row Total: 
 
Black   a    b        a + b 
 
Hispanic  c    d        c + d 
 
White   e    f        e + f 
 
Column Total:       a + c + e        b + d + f 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 From this a test-statistic is calculated and compared to a critical value from a chi-
square table.  If the test-statistic is larger than the critical value, it lends credence to the 
assumption that the categorical variables have some association.  If the test statistic 
exceeds the critical value, then ethnicity is associated with the sentence received.  If the 
test-statistic is smaller than the critical value, ethnicity is not associated with sentence. 
Two-sample t-tests were performed to assess whether the mean from a variable 
differed from a determined constant. A two-sample t-test compares the mean difference 
between each value of the variable and a test value which assumes no variation.  This 
analysis was used to test for significant differences between means. 
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This study also utilized the two-way ANOVA procedure to test whether the 
means of certain groups are equal considering the possible interaction of independent 
variables.   
 Parameter estimates from a general linear model, an analysis of the relationship 
between independent variables and a continuous dependent variable, modeled by a least 
squares function, was used in an attempt to predict sentence.  Models indicate which 
independent variables, if any, are predictors of the dependent variable.  A common 
example is socioeconomic status and academic achievement.  A positive, linear 
relationship is usually found when comparing socioeconomic status and academic 
achievement.  In this study, independent variables such as plea bargaining vs. trial, the 
offense severity, ethnicity, gender and interaction effects were studied for their predictive 
power on sentencing. 
By creating different models, this study attempted to discover a coefficient 
estimate for conviction type – plea bargain vs. trial, while considering contact variables.  
That is, can sentence length be predicted by adjudication method while controlling for 
independent variables such as ethnicity, gender, offense seriousness, quantity and 
interaction effects? 
Coding 
Coding was created for the independent variables of gender, ethnicity, conviction 
type and the different types of offense severity – sales vs. possession and then quantity.  
Those variables may then be incorporated into a variety of models to search for 
statistically significant results relating to the application of said variables as a function of 
the adjudication method to predict sentence length. 
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Interaction occurs when a mixed effect may be present.  An interaction is 
associated with the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable based on 
the values of another predictor.  For example, there may be a difference in sentence based 
on ethnicity but that may come about from the conviction mode.  As such, the correlation 
between variables may depend on the value from other variables. 
Comparison of variable interaction may be obtained by assigning specific dummy 
values for data from each variable.  Hays (1994) and Pedhazur (1997) discuss a code 
scenario for defining independent variables as dummy or group variables.  Categorical 
variables are effect coded, that is, each category’s mean is compared to a grand mean 
where each category’s intercept is compared to the reference group’s intercept. 
Schemes for Codes 
 The following table illustrates the codes used in this study for the independent 
variables.  The dependent variable, sentence, was coded as a continuous variable. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Independent Variable Coding Schemes 
 
Conviction Mode     Code 
Plea Bargain  0 
Trial Conviction 1 
__________________________________________ 
Probation or Prison Code 
Probation     0 
Prison      1 
__________________________________________ 
 
Seriousness Code 
Possession    0 
Sales     1 
__________________________________________ 
Quantity Code 
< 15 g     0 
≥ 15 g     1 
__________________________________________ 
Gender Code 
Male     0 
Female    1 
__________________________________________ 
Ethnicity    Ethnic Group    Not of that Group 
Black      1          0 
Hispanic     1          0 
__________________________________________ 
 
 Dummy codes were used for these categorical variables.  Seven of the almost 
thirteen-thousand offenders were noted as being other than Black, Hispanic or White and 
were ignored in this study as they make up only 0.05% of the sample.  The following 
table displays the ethnicity coding. 
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For gender, male was coded as 0 while female was coded as 1.  This again allows 
for a comparison; men will make up approximately 87% of the convictions.  Johnson 
(2003) found that sentence received correlates to gender.  
For conviction type, plea bargain was coded 0 while convicted at trial was 1.  This 
set-up will create a coefficient estimate of the trial tax, net of everything else in the 
model.  Probation will be coded 0 while having received prison time will be coded 1. 
 Selling of narcotics was coded 1 while possession was coded 0 for the analysis.  
Therefore, the coefficient result will tell the “extra” sentence, if any, for the more serious 
offense of selling.  Quantity was considered by coding less than 15 grams as 0 while 
equal to or greater than 15 grams as 1.  This may reveal an “extra” sentence impact for 
the greater quantity of drugs involved. 
For the two-sample t-tests and ANOVAs used in this study making Group A = 0 
and Group B = 1 or the other way around does not impact the output from any analysis as 
this is dummy coding. 
However, this study utilized parameter estimates from a general linear model 
analysis to estimate sentence.  In such analyses the largest categorical value serves as the 
reference point for comparison purposes.  For example, coding the variable named 
conviction mode with plea bargain = 0 and trial conviction = 1 allows for the comparison 
of any “extra” sentence received associated with a trial conviction. 
 Interaction effects occur when the interfacing of two or more independent 
variables creates its own effect beyond the main effect of the independent variables 
themselves.  In this study the interaction effect coding occurred within the software 
utilized for running single dependent variable general linear models. 
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The combination of chi-square analyses, two-sample t-tests, two-way ANOVAs 
and general linear models yielded answers to this study’s focus on the possible existence 
of a trial tax and what independent variables may be used to predict sentence.
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
This study utilized two-way ANOVA, chi-square tests, two-sample t-tests and 
general linear models in an attempt to answer the following questions.  Does the trial tax 
exist in Cook County, Illinois?  In other words, are defendants convicted at trial more 
likely to receive heftier sentences than those who plea bargain?  Assuming a disparity, 
does it remain when controlling for other variables such as gender, ethnicity, offense 
seriousness, quantity and interaction effects? 
 Before proceeding, a review of the dataset’s characteristics was performed.  First, 
an analysis of the statutes was effected to determine if any, or a group, dominate the 
dataset.  The influence of prevailing statutes may skew the results of this study.  An 
investigation of offense severity was performed to search for its effect on results.  The 
more serious a crime should, in theory, lead to a higher sentence, thus also possibly 
distorting the results.   To further guide the analyses used in this study an examination of 
the subjects was conducted.  With all, the main group remained those who plea bargained 
vs. those convicted at trial, while considering other independent variables. 
Dominant Statutes 
 
The analysis began by creating a frequency distribution of statutes violated.  This 
was done to determine if a statute or group of statutes might skew the results by their 
domination of the dataset.  It yielded the following results.
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Table 5 
 
Frequency Distribution of Statutes Violated_ 
 
Statute          Frequency Percent 
Sales: 
1. Heroin 15-99g    104    0.8%  
2. Heroin 100-399g        5    0.0%  
3. Heroin 400-899g        3    0.0%  
4. Heroin 900+g        3    0.0%  
5. Cocaine 15-99g    376    2.9%  
6. Cocaine 100-399g      62    0.5% 
7. Cocaine 400-899g      17    0.1% 
8. Cocaine 900+g      40    0.3% 
9. Heroin 1-14g 1,389   10.9% 
10. Cocaine 1-14g 1,964   15.4% 
11. Heroin or 
      Cocaine <1g 3,163   24.7% 
Possession: 
12. Heroin 15-99g        2    0.0% 
16. Cocaine 15-99g      79    0.6% 
17. Cocaine 100-399g      14    0.1% 
19. Cocaine 900+g        1    0.0% 
20. Heroin or 
      Cocaine < 15g 5,564  43.5% 
____________________________________ 
Four statutes, 13 – 15 and 18 were not represented.  Of the 12,786 cases, 94.5% 
related to just four of the remaining statutes.  Statute 20, possession of less than 15g of 
cocaine or heroin accounted for 43.5% of all violations in this study.  Statutes 9, 10 and 
11, distribution of 1 – 14g of heroin, distribution of 1 – 14g of cocaine and distribution of 
less than 1g of cocaine or heroin, respectively, made up 51% of all cases studied. 
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 Statute 20 represents possession crimes with 43.5% of all cases while Statutes 9, 
10 and 11 characterize the impact of sales crimes making up 51% of all violations.  
Almost 95% of the convictions in this study relate to quantities less than 15g.  However, 
traditional wisdom suggests that larger quantities result in longer sentences.  As such, the 
impact of crimes dealing with quantities of 15g or more was studied separately.  This was 
done both in comparison to crimes dealing with less than 15g and for the interaction 
effect between quantity and possess vs. sell to study seriousness. 
Probation vs. Prison 
 Considering all statutes, just over 5% of the subjects in this dataset received a 
sentence of probation as indicated by a sentence length of zero.  As noted previously, 
some consider plea bargaining an indicator of the willingness to accept responsibility and 
perhaps a propensity to reform.  In addition, those who plead guilty may receive a 
bargain on their sentence.  Over 93% of the subjects plea bargained.  The following 
tables illustrate both distributions. 
Table 6 
Comparison of Probation vs. Prison__ 
      N          Percentage   
 
Probation      682            5.3% 
 
Prison  12,104          94.7% 
 
Total  12,786          100% 
______________________________ 
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Table 7 
Comparison of Plea Bargain vs. Trial Conviction         _   
      N          Percentage  
Plea Bargain 11,903          93.1% 
 
Trial 
Conviction           883            6.9% 
 
Total  12,786          100% 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Conviction Mode 
 The following table shows that, of those who received a prison sentence, almost 
95% received the sentence through plea bargaining.  Thus, the majority of subjects in this 
study plea bargained and received a prison sentence. 
Table 8 
Prison Time by Conviction Mode     __ 
           Prison____ 
Plea Bargain  11,437 (94.5%) 
 
Trial Conviction      667 (5.6%) 
 
Total   12,104 (100%) 
_______________________________ 
The following table presents the comparison of conviction mode to whether the 
subject received prison or probation.  For the entire data set, over 96% of those who plea 
bargained received a prison sentence.  Plea bargainers and those who receive a prison 
term dominate the data set. 
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Table 9 
Conviction Mode Compared to Probation or Prison_                 _ 
  Plea Bargain   Trial Conviction            All_       _ 
Probation       466 (3.9%)      216 (24.5%)           682 (5.3%) 
 
Prison   11,437 (96.1%)    667 (75.5%)      12,104 (94.7%) 
 
Total   11,903 (100%)     883 (100%)       12,786 (100%) 
_____________________________________________________ 
 An analysis of this data found a significant association between conviction mode 
and probation vs. prison (χ2 = 683.22, p < 0.0001). 
 Subjects not receiving a prison sentence will no longer be considered in the 
analyses for this study.  The data set is dominated by those who received a prison 
sentence – almost 95% of all subjects.  In addition, the study’s intent is to test for the 
presence of a trial tax and if it is found, attempt to measure it.  Those receiving a sentence 
of zero months did not receive a trial tax, regardless of their conviction mode.  By 
definition of this study’s intent they should be excluded. 
 The following table shows the comparison of sentence means, for those receiving 
prison time, based on conviction mode. 
Table 10 
Comparison of Sentence and Conviction Mode for Mean Sentence (in Months) 
Conviction Mode           N        M         SD  _ 
 
Plea Bargain        11,437  25.87   17.05 
 
Trial Conviction      667  42.59   37.64 
 
Total              12,104  26.79   19.16  
______________________________________________________________ 
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 Those convicted at trial received a statistically significant, greater sentence than 
those who plea bargained – almost 17 months or 65% more prison time (t = 153.882, p < 
0.0001).  A check of the distribution of means was performed.  For plea bargainers, their 
sentences ranged from 0.03 months to 204.00 months.  For those convicted at trial the 
sentences ranged from 0.20 months to 420.00 months.  In answer to this study’s primary 
research question, this evidence suggests a trial tax does exist.  The study will now focus 
on contextual variables. 
Offense Seriousness 
 As noted earlier in this study, offense seriousness is classified according to 
whether the crime relates to possession or selling narcotics and the quantity involved, less 
than 15g or equal to or greater than 15 g.  The more serious a crime, traditional wisdom 
suggests, the more lengthy the sentence.  A frequency distribution for this dataset 
revealed the following. 
Table 11 
Convictions for Quantity Compared to Offense Seriousness 
Seriousness          < 15g           ≥ 15g____             
 
Possession     5,395 (47.0%)         79 (12.6%) 
 
Sales      6,082 (53.0%)       548 (87.4%) 
 
Total     11,477 (100%)       627 (100%) 
_______________________________________________ 
 
 A simple visual inspection reveals that, for equal to or greater than 15g crimes, 
over 86% related to narcotics distribution, not simple possession.  This strongly suggests 
that quantity associates with whether the crime related to possession or sales.  A chi-
square analysis affirms the supposition (χ2 = 282.74, p < 0.0001) that quantity relates to 
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possession or sales.  The subsequent table illustrates the mean sentence in months for 
quantity by offense seriousness.  Convictions involving < 15g dominate the dataset 
making up almost 95% of all cases while possession compared to sales crimes is about 
equally split.  A check of the distribution of means was performed.  For those convicted 
of crimes relating to < 15g, the sentences for possessors ranged from 0.03 to 168.00 
months; for those who sold, 0.07 months to 240.00 months.  For those convicted of ≥ 15g 
crimes, the sentences for possessors ranged from 0.10 to 144.00 months; for those who 
sold, 0.07 months to 420.00 months. 
Table 12 
Mean Sentence (in Months) for Seriousness Factors______________ 
               < 15g               ≥ 15g_________ 
 
      N           M       SD__            N          M         SD__ 
 
Possession 5,395    18.46    8.72          79   41.26    25.72 
 
Sales  6,082    31.67  18.98       548   52.64    40.30 
 
Total  11,477    25.46  16.44    627      51.20    38.94      
_______________________________________________________ 
 
Next, a two-way ANOVA was run to test for interaction between quantity and 
offense seriousness for mean sentences.  As noted in the next table, no interaction was 
detected (F = 0.775, p = 0.379, Levene’s test of equality p < 0.0001, Observed Power = 
0.142). 
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Table 13 
Analysis of Variance for Sentence Length______________ 
Variable  df       F          η2     p__ 
Possess vs. sell  1 139.356     0.011 0.000 
Quantity   1 441.163     0.035 0.000 
Interaction   1     0.775     0.000 0.379 
 
Subjects 
within-group error 12,103     (0.203) 
_______________________________________________ 
 
 Selling, as opposed to possession, leads to a higher prison sentence regardless of 
quantity.  The quantity ≥ 15g results in a greater sentence than < 15g regardless of 
whether the defendant sold or simply possessed the narcotic.  As such, quantity and 
possession vs. sales should be used in the general linear model as independent variables.  
In terms of mean sentence, there is no interaction between possession vs. sales and 
quantity.  Based on the statistical results, this study will not utilize an interaction effect 
for seriousness and quantity. 
Gender 
 The next table illustrates the frequency distribution of gender in the aggregate and 
by conviction mode. 
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Table 14 
Comparison of Gender and Conviction Mode_______                 ___ 
Gender  Plea Bargain     Trial Conviction              All_        _ 
 
Male       9,892 (86.5%)       590 (88.5%)         10,482 (86.6%) 
 
Female  1,542 (13.5%)        77 (11.5%)            1,622 (13.4%) 
 
Total  11,437 (100%)       667 (100%)          12,104 (100%) 
_______________________________________________________ 
As noted earlier, over 93% of the subjects chose to plea bargain and almost 87% 
of those were male.  86.5% of those who plea bargained were male and 88.5% of those 
convicted at trial were male.  Females made up 13.5% of all plea bargainers and 11.5% of 
all those convicted at trial.  A review of the breakdown by gender shows neither males 
nor females were more likely to plea bargain or have lost at trial (χ2 = 1.89, p = 0.169).  It 
seems gender is not associated with whether a subject plea bargains or loses at trial even 
though males dominate the dataset.  However, the possible interaction may be veiled as 
the dataset is so dominated by males. 
 As noted previously, a review of sentence means from this dataset revealed that 
those who plea bargain receive a significantly lighter sentence than those convicted at 
trial.  If there is no difference between males and females plea bargaining, as indicated 
above, it seems logical that their sentences would be similar unless an interaction effect 
exists. 
Gender and Conviction Mode Compared to Sentence 
 The subsequent table shows the mean sentence by gender in the aggregate and 
then by conviction mode.  A check of the distribution of means was performed.  For plea 
bargainers the males’ sentences ranged from 0.03 months to 204.00 months.  Female plea 
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bargainer sentences ranged from 0.03 months to 96 months.  For those convicted at trial, 
male sentences ranged from 0.20 months to 420.00 months while female sentences from 
0.67 months to 96 months. 
Table 15 
Comparison of Gender and Conviction Mode for Mean Sentence (in Months)_______ __ 
           Male                            Female                               All           __  
Conviction Mode       N         M        SD_         N        M         SD          N       M         SD_     
 
Plea Bargain         9,892   26.49   17.65       1,545  21.92    11.84   11,437  25.87    17.05 
 
Trial Conviction         590   44.36   38.93           77   29.05    20.26        667  42.59    37.64 
 
Total         10,482  27.50   20.35        1,622  22.26   12.45   12,104   26.79   19.16 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 It appears that males tended to receive heftier prison sentences regardless of 
conviction mode.  A two-way ANOVA was run to check for interaction between gender 
and conviction type considering sentence.  A significant interaction was found (F = 
21.398, p < 0.0001, Levene’s Test of Equality p < 0.0001, Observed Power = 0.996) as 
illustrated in the next table. 
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Table 16 
Analysis of Variance for Gender and Conviction Mode Regarding Sentence 
Variable  df       F          η2               p_                          _ 
Gender   1   73.384     0.006 0.000 
Conviction Mode  1 115.995     0.009 0.000 
Interaction   1   21.398     0.002 0.000 
 
Subjects 
within-group error 12,103     (0.049) 
____________________________________________________________ 
In partial answer to the research question related to controlling variables, the 
interaction between gender and conviction mode matters in terms of sentence.  Males 
receive a heftier sentence than their female counterparts. 
Figure 1 illustrates the gender disparity.  The x-axis shows sentence in months.  
The y-axis indicates the categorical variable plea bargain vs. trial conviction.  Regardless 
of conviction mode, males received the higher sentence.  However, males appear to have 
received a much heftier sentence than females when convicted at trial.  Females receive 
the least hefty sentence, period.  However, being female and plea bargaining produces the 
lowest sentence. 
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Figure 1.  Comparison of sentence means considering conviction mode and gender. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
The next controlling variable to be explored is ethnicity. 
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Ethnicity 
 The below tables illustrate ethnic distribution by conviction mode and in the 
aggregate. 
Table 17 
Comparison of Ethnicity and Conviction Mode___                                                _____ 
Conviction Mode            Black               Hispanic               White                  All_         _            
 
Plea Bargain  9,360 (94.2%)    900 (95.4%)    1,177 (96.2%)   11,437 (94.5%) 
 
Trial Conviction    577 (5.8%)      43 (4.6%)           47 (3.8%)          667 (5.5%) 
 
Total   9,937 (100%)    943 (100%)     1,224 (100%)    12,104 (100%) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Ethnicity is significantly associated with choosing to plea bargain vs. receiving a 
trial conviction (χ2 = 9.87, p = 0.0072).  It appears that Whites are more likely to plea 
bargain compared to Blacks who are more likely to have not taken the plea bargain and 
then lost at trial.  As noted earlier, those who plea bargain receive a statistically 
significant lower sentence than those convicted at trial.  If Blacks receive a higher mean 
sentence, their propensity to go to trial and lose (not to plea bargain), may explain that 
group’s higher mean sentence. 
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Ethnicity and Conviction Mode compared to Sentence 
Table 18 
Comparison of Ethnicity and Conviction Mode for Mean Sentence (in Months)_____ 
               Plea Bargain                Trial Conviction                      Total          ___ 
Ethnicity 
           N        M         SD__         N      M        SD___       N         M        SD__ 
 
Black        9,360    26.20    16.28         577   43.10   34.42        9,937   27.18   18.23 
 
Hispanic         900   26.17    22.47           43   36.17   36.74            943  26.63   23.38           
 
White         1,177   23.05    17.95      47 42.14   60.05       1,224  23.78   22.10 
 
All             11,437   25.87    17.05    667   42.59   37.64     12,104  26.79   19.16 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 The above table illustrates the mean sentence received based on conviction mode 
and ethnicity.  A check of the distribution of means was performed.  For plea bargainers, 
Blacks’ sentences ranged from 0.03 months to 192 months, Hispanics’ from 0.07 months 
to 204.00 months and for Whites the mean sentence ranged from 0.03 to 180.00 months.  
For those convicted at trial, Blacks’ sentences ranged from 0.20 months to 240.00 
months, Hispanics’ from 0.67 to 180.00 months and for Whites, from 0.20 months to 
420.00 months. 
A two-way ANOVA was run to check for interaction between ethnicity and 
conviction mode regarding sentence length.  None was found (F = 2.024, p = 0.132, 
Levene’s Test of Equality p < 0.0001, Observed Power = 0.586) as illustrated below. 
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Table 19 
Analysis of Variance for Ethnicity and Conviction Mode Regarding Sentence 
Variable  df       F          η2               p_ _______________ 
Ethnicity   2     3.405     0.001 0.082 
Conviction Mode  1  124.435    0.010 0.000 
Interaction   2     3.016     0.000 0.089 
 
Subjects 
within-group error 12,103     (0.042) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
No effect was found for ethnicity or the interaction of ethnicity and the conviction 
mode.  However, there was a main effect for conviction.  As such, controlling for 
ethnicity, there is still a trial tax effect, that is, an association between sentence length and 
conviction mode.  Regardless of ethnicity, sentence length is greater for those convicted 
at trial compared to those who plea bargained. 
 The next analysis performed tested for an association between ethnicity and the 
seriousness categories. 
Ethnicity and Offense Seriousness 
 Frequency distribution tables of ethnicity and possession vs. sales and then 
ethnicity and quantity appear next. 
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Table 20 
Comparison of Ethnicity and Offense Seriousness____                                            __ 
Seriousness                   Black              Hispanic          White                   All_        _ 
 
Possession  3,908 (39.3%)    578 (61.3%)    988 (80.7%)    5,474 (45.2%) 
 
Sales   6,029 (60.7%)    365 (38.7%)    236 (19.3%)    6,630 (54.8%) 
 
Total   9,937 (100%)    943 (100%)   1,224 (100%)  12,104 (100%) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 21 
Comparison of Ethnicity and Quantity                  ____                                               __ 
Quantity                  Black               Hispanic             White                  All_          _ 
 
< 15g   9,532 (95.9%)    815 (86.4%)    1,130 (92.3%)    11,477 (94.8%) 
 
≥ 15g     405 (4.1%)    128 (13.2%)         94 (7.7%)          627 (5.2%) 
 
Total   9,937 (100%)    943 (100%)     1,224 (100%)     12,104 (100%) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 A chi-square analysis found a significant association between ethnicity and 
possession vs. sales (χ2 = 756.54, p < 0.0001).  Another chi-square analysis found a 
significant association between ethnicity and quantity (χ2 = 32.3, p < 0.0001).  It seems 
Blacks are convicted more often of sales crimes but Whites are more often convicted of 
the larger quantities.  Whites seem to receive possession convictions for larger quantities 
while Blacks receive sales convictions for the smaller quantities. 
 The subsequent table presents a comparison of sentence means based on ethnicity 
and possession vs. sales.  A check of the distribution of means was performed.  For 
possession crimes, Blacks’ sentences ranged from 0.03 months to 168.00 months, 
Hispanics’ from 0.07 months to 84.00 months and for Whites the mean sentence ranged 
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from 0.03 to 72.00 months.  For sales crimes, Blacks’ sentences ranged from 0.07 months 
to 240.00 months, Hispanics’ from 0.07 to 204.00 months and for Whites, from 0.27 
months to 420.00 months. 
Table 22 
Comparison of Ethnicity and Possession vs. Sales for Mean Sentence (in Months)____ 
                 Possession                        Sales                              Total___________                               
Ethnicity 
           N        M       SD__         N       M        SD__       N         M        SD__  _ 
 
Black           3,908  18.66    9.79        6,029   32.71  20.27      9,937   27.18   18.23  
 
Hispanic         578  18.88    9.30      365   38.91  32.10     943   26.63   23.38 
 
White             988  19.25    8.87       236   42.76  42.00       1,224  23.78   22.10 
 
All         5,474  18.79    9.58 6,630  33.41  22.31 12,104  26.79   19.16 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 The next offense seriousness analysis relates to quantity.  The below table 
presents a comparison of sentence means based on ethnicity and quantity.  A check of the 
distribution of means was performed.  For < 15g crimes, Blacks’ sentences ranged from 
0.03 months to 240.00 months, Hispanics’ from 0.07 months to 72.00 months and for 
Whites the mean sentence ranged from 0.03 to 108.00 months.  For ≥ 15g crimes, Blacks’ 
sentences ranged from 0.07 months to 192.00 months, Hispanics’ from 0.07 to 204.00 
months and for Whites, from 0.10 months to 420.00 months. 
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Table 23 
Comparison of Ethnicity and Quantity for Mean Sentence (in Months)_                   __ 
                     < 15g                               ≥ 15g                                   Total   __         
Ethnicity 
           N       M       SD__           N        M       SD___       N         M       SD_       
 
Black          9,532  26.34  17.06          405  46.92   30.61        9,937   27.18  18.23 
 
Hispanic          815  21.40  11.71     128    59.92   43.38           943   26.63  23.38 
 
Whites          1,130  20.95  12.25     94 57.77   57.78       1,224  23.78  22.10 
 
All        11,477  25.46  16.44   627   51.20   38.94      12,104 26.79  19.16 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 The mean and standard deviation for Whites convicted of crimes relating to ≥ 15g 
both being so close to 57.8 is pure coincidence.  Again, for that group the ninety-four 
subjects had sentences varying from 0.10 months to 420 months. 
 To examine the effects of ethnicity, quantity and seriousness a three-way factorial 
ANOVA was conducted.  Its output appears in the table below. 
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Table 24 
Analysis of Variance for Ethnicity and Quantity and Seriousness Regarding Sentence 
Variable   df           F            η2    p_                                           _ 
 
Ethnicity    2        3.618     0.001 0.027 
Quantity    1    359.942     0.029 0.000 
Seriousness    1    126.420     0.010 0.000 
Ethnicity * Quantity   2        4.162     0.001 0.016 
Ethnicity * Seriousness 2      14.992      0.002 0.000 
Quantity * Seriousness 1        2.802      0.000 0.094 
Three-way Interaction: 
Ethnicity * Quantity * 
Seriousness    2     13.964       0.002 0.078 
 
Subjects 
within-group error 12,103     (0.210) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 No three-way interaction was detected (F = 13.964, p = 0.078, Levene’s Test of 
Equality p < 0.0001, Observed Power = 0.387).  However, there was a main effect for 
ethnicity, quantity and seriousness.  The interaction between ethnicity and quantity and 
ethnicity and seriousness was again noted.  There was no significant interaction between 
quantity and seriousness. 
An interaction between ethnicity and possession vs. sales as it relates to sentence 
was found (F = 14.992, p < 0.0001).  As an interaction was found, there was no need to 
interpret the main effect.  Differences in sentence based on ethnicity appear to depend on 
the statutory seriousness of the crime – possession or sales.  Whites receive the heftiest 
sentences while Blacks receive the least severe sentences for sales crimes. 
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Figure 2.  Comparison of sentence means considering ethnicity and possess vs. sell. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the interaction of ethnicity compared to possession vs. sales in 
terms of sentence.  The x-axis represents sentence in months.  The y-axis represents the 
categorical variable possess vs. sell.  Sentences appear not that different, in terms of 
ethnicity, for possession crimes.  For sales crimes, however, Whites tend to receive the 
highest mean sentence and Blacks the lowest.   
An interaction between ethnicity and quantity as it relates to sentence was found 
(F = 4.162, p = 0.016).  As an interaction was found, there was no need to interpret the 
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main effect.  Differences in sentence based on ethnicity appear to depend on the quantity 
involved. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Comparison of sentence means considering ethnicity and quantity. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the interaction of ethnicity compared to quantity in terms of 
sentence.  The x-axis shows sentence in months.  The y-axis represents the categorical 
variable < 15g or ≥ 15g.  For the smaller quantity of < 15g the sentences do not appear 
that far apart.  For the larger quantities, ≥ 15g, a greater disparity is indicated. 
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Sentence means by ethnicity do not vary much for lower quantities, which make 
up, as noted earlier in Table 8, almost 95% of all convictions in this dataset.  Overall, it 
seems Blacks tend to have longer sentences for sales crimes for quantities < 15g while 
Whites have longer sentences for possessing quantities ≥ 15g.  However, most 
convictions in this data set, 95%, were for < 15g and Blacks dominate the dataset, 82%. 
 In addition to using ethnicity as an independent variable in the general linear 
model, interaction variables for ethnicity and possession vs. sales and ethnicity and 
quantity will also be utilized. 
Summary 
 Overall, trial convictions are significantly associated with a higher sentence than 
plea bargain convictions.  Almost 95% of the subjects of this dataset plea bargained 
which may skew analyses results toward the plea bargain characteristic of lesser 
sentence.  As such, interaction effects between the controlling variables and conviction 
mode, compared to sentence, were analyzed.  Males made up 87% of all subjects and 
minorities accounted for 90% of all subjects.  The dataset’s domination by certain groups 
based on gender and ethnicity led to the analysis of interaction effects between those 
independent variables and conviction mode compared to sentence. 
 Crime seriousness, based on possession or sales and then quantity, showed no 
interaction effect.  Crimes involving < 15g made up 95% of all cases but were relatively 
evenly split between possession or sales convictions.  Statutes for ≥ 15g, 5% of all cases, 
showed 86% of those convictions were for sales crimes.  Possession vs. sales associated 
with quantity. 
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 Sales crimes netted the greater sentence when compared to simple possession.  ≥ 
15g crimes made up only 5% of the dataset but produced a greater mean sentence than 
crimes of < 15g.  Overall, the dataset is dominated by convictions for the smaller 
quantities.  Offense seriousness, possession vs. sales and quantity, ties directly to the 
results for ethnicity as explained below.  Regardless of any other independent variable, 
increased seriousness resulted in increased sentence.  As such, the independent variables 
of possession vs. sales and then quantity will be used in the upcoming general linear 
models. 
Males dominate the data set.  Gender was not associated with conviction mode.  
That is, being male or female didn’t matter in terms of predicting conviction mode.  
However, gender did associate to sentence.  The interaction of gender and conviction 
mode was also significantly associated with sentence.  Males tended to receive a higher 
sentence regardless of conviction mode.  However, for those convicted at trial, they 
received a much higher sentence than their female counterparts.  As such, gender itself 
and the interaction effect between it and conviction mode will be utilized as predictor 
variables in the upcoming general linear model section. 
Minorities dominate the dataset as Blacks make up 82% and Hispanics 8% of all 
subjects.  Ethnicity showed a significant association in terms of whether the subject plea 
bargained or lost at trial and in terms of sentence.  Blacks seem less likely to plea 
bargain, which at first may seem to explain their higher overall mean sentence as trial 
convictions result in more hefty sentences.  However, no evidence was found for an 
interaction between ethnicity and conviction mode.  Regardless of ethnicity, a trial 
conviction resulted in a greater sentence than a plea bargain. 
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In terms of offense seriousness, Blacks associated more with sales crimes while 
Whites associated more with ≥ 15g convictions.  It should be remembered, however, that 
the greater quantity accounted for only 5% of all cases.  Evidence was found for an 
interaction between ethnicity and possession vs. sales and then for quantity.  Blacks, 
compared to Whites, were more often convicted of and received higher sentences for 
sales crimes involving < 15g.  Whites, compared to Blacks, were more often convicted of 
and received heftier sentences for possession crimes of ≥ 15g.  Differences in sentence 
based on ethnicity depend on the seriousness of the crime, that is, whether it was for 
possession or sales and the quantity.  Based on these results, ethnicity and the referenced 
interactions will serve as independent variables in the general linear models. 
 In an attempt to measure the noted associations, parameter estimates from general 
linear models were computed. 
General Linear Models 
Does plea bargaining vs. a trial conviction predict sentence duration when controlling for 
predictor variables? 
 
 General linear models, an analysis of the linear relationship between independent 
variables and a continuous dependent variable, modeled by a least squares function, was 
used in an attempt to predict sentence.  Models indicate which independent variables, if 
any, are predictors of the dependent variable and to what degree.  As always in this study, 
the single dependent variable remains sentence, measured in months.  The following table 
notes the independent variables used. 
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Table 25 
Independent Variables______________________ 
 
1. Conviction Mode – Jury Trial or Plea Bargain 
2. Seriousness – Possession or Sales 
3. Quantity (<15g or ≥15g) 
4. Gender 
5. Gender * Conviction Mode 
6. Black 
7. Hispanic 
8. Black * Seriousness 
9. Hispanic * Seriousness 
10. Black * Quantity 
11. Hispanic * Quantity 
______________________________________ 
 Based on t-test, chi-square and two-way ANOVA analyses, each of the above 
independent variables showed an association with sentence. 
 Analyses suggested a significant association between conviction mode and 
sentence – trial convictions, resulted in more hefty sentences.  However, an interaction 
effect was found between conviction mode and whether the defendant received probation 
or prison. 
Previous analyses in this study showed a significant association between sentence 
and whether the related crime was for possession or sales of narcotics and the quantity 
involved.  Sales and greater quantity crimes correlated with increased sentences. 
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Other analyses indicated that females tend to get a lighter sentence than males and 
that an interaction effect between gender and conviction mode exists.  Males received 
heavier sentences regardless of conviction mode, but especially heavy sentences for trial 
convictions when compared to females. 
Still other analyses indicated that Whites received lighter sentences than 
minorities, overall and for plea bargaining cases but not for trial convictions.  Minorities 
tended to be convicted more often of sales crimes involving < 15g and Whites received 
the higher sentences for possessing ≥ 15g – a significant interaction effect occurred for 
ethnicity and offense severity in terms of being Black and possession vs. sales crimes, 
Black and quantity and Hispanic and quantity. 
The next table summarizes the coding scheme used for the independent variables. 
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Table 26 
Summary of Independent Variable Coding Schemes 
 
Conviction Mode     Code 
Plea Bargain  0 
Trial Conviction 1 
__________________________________________ 
Seriousness Code 
Possession    0 
Sales     1 
__________________________________________ 
Quantity Code 
< 15 g     0 
≥ 15 g     1 
__________________________________________ 
Gender Code 
Male     0 
Female    1 
__________________________________________ 
Ethnicity    Ethnic Group    Not of that Group 
Black      1          0 
Hispanic     1          0 
__________________________________________ 
 The use of coding allows for the creation of multiple linear models based on a 
subject’s characteristics.  For example, one convict may be a White male convicted at 
trial for possessing < 15g.  Another subject may be a Black male who plea bargained his 
conviction for selling ≥ 15g.  A foundational linear model appears below; it accounts for 
all independent variables.  See Appendix A for a complete listing of models. 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + 
(β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + (β6)(Black) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β8)(Black * Sell) + 
(β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + (β10)(Black * ≥  15g) + (β11)(Hispanic * ≥ 15g) + e 
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The subsequent table displays the output using all predictor variables.  Defendants 
who received probation were not included.  The central theme of this study relates to 
testing for and measuring the trial tax, that is, the additional sentence received for a trial 
conviction compared to a plea bargain.  Those who received probation did so whether 
they plea bargained or lost at trial; as such, they were excluded from in the analysis. 
Table 27 
Summary of Linear Model Analysis to Predict Sentence Using All Independent Variables 
 
         Variable                              b                 SE(b)                  p.  _______________    _ 
 
Constant   18.846  0.543  0.000 
 
Trial Conviction    3.306  0.593  0.000 
 
Sell      7.419  1.846  0.000 
≥ 15 g    20.467  2.771  0.000 
Female             -14.469  2.025  0.000 
Female X Trial Conviction 11.445  2.076  0.000 
Black              -13.807  1.945  0.000 
Hispanic    -1.535  2.298  0.504 
Black X Sell     2.612  1.363  0.055 
Hispanic X Sell    5.184  1.814  0.404 
Black X ≥ 15 g  10.830  2.131  0.000 
Hispanic X ≥ 15 g   -4.253  2.636  0.107 
R Square 0.239 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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 Interpreting the output from the previous table must be done in comparison to 
“the other” from the variable noted.  For example, the variable Trial Conviction is the 
comparison of being convicted at trial to plea bargaining.  The variable Sell refers to 
selling a narcotic as opposed to simply possessing it.  The variable Female refers to the 
coefficient for females when compared to males. 
The output begins with a constant of regression equal to 18.846 months.  Every 
subject begins with that as a sentence and then the contextual variables may add or 
subtract time, via the model, to that time.  Being convicted at trial adds 3.306 months to 
the sentence.  Continuing, if it was a sales crime another 7.419 months is added to the 
sentence.  Selling the larger quantity of narcotics, ≥ 15g, will increase sentence by 20.467 
months.  As predicted, a trial conviction and greater seriousness is associated with a 
heftier sentence. 
Being female reduces sentence by 14.469 months.  As predicted, being female 
was associated with a reduced sentence but a female convicted at trial received less of a 
reduced sentence than one who plea bargained.  Females who lose at trial, however, 
receive an additional 11.445 months on top of the constant. 
 This initial coefficient of Blacks receiving a sentence reduction of 13.807 months 
may be explained by the domination of minorities in this dataset – almost 90% (χ2 = 
9.13, p = 0.0025).  Blacks made up 82.2% and Hispanics 7.7%.  As noted previously, for 
the mean sentence, by ethnicity, for quantities equal to or greater than 15g, Blacks 
received the lowest mean sentence of 41.86 months.  Whites received a mean sentence of 
48.49 months while Hispanics received 55.18 months.  In addition, 92.7% of all Blacks 
plea bargained.  Since a plea bargain seems to yield a lighter sentence, and as the 
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overwhelming majority of subjects plea bargaining were minorities, this may explain the 
lower coefficient. 
 In addition, the interaction between Black and Sell was not statistically significant 
in this linear model.  This may be due to the fact that, as noted Figure 2, the mean 
sentence of all ethnicities for possession crimes varied by only about two weeks (t = -
1029.498, p = 0.615).  However, it yielded a p value of 0.055 which is close to being 
significant.  As such, the variable will be included in subsequent tables.  For sales crimes, 
the mean sentence for Whites exceeded Blacks by about eight months (t = -108.953, p < 
0.0001) and the mean sentence for Whites exceeded Hispanics by about two months (t = -
102.300, p < 0.0001).  The co-mingling of mean sentences for ethnicities in this variable, 
significant for sales crimes but not for possession crimes, produced a result that was not 
statistically significant. 
 However, the interaction between Black and ≥ 15 g yielded an extra 10.830 
months. 
 Being Hispanic did not produce a statistically significant difference in sentence 
nor did the interaction effects. 
The R Square value for this model equaled 0.239.  This means that the model 
accounts for only 24% of the variance in the dependent variable, sentence. 
Grand Summary 
 
 Overall, trial convictions are significantly associated with a higher sentence than 
plea bargain convictions.  In the general linear models, a trial conviction resulted in a 
positive, significant coefficient.  Per results from analyzing this dataset, a trial tax exists 
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in Cook County – plea bargainers tend to receive lesser sentences than those convicted at 
trial. 
 Factoring out the impact of a sentence equal to zero, that is, receiving probation, 
also showed a significant coefficient for measuring sentence.  This variable elucidated 
sentence by considering the fact that a sentence of zero skews the mean value for 
sentence.  As such, those receiving probation were not included in the general linear 
model. 
 The seriousness of the crime, quantity and then possession vs. sales also yielded 
an increased sentence as evidenced by the positive, significant coefficient. 
 Females received a significantly less sentence than males, but suffered an 
increased sentence, just like their male counterparts, when convicted at trial.  As such, 
this study concluded that the controlling variable gender is associated with sentence.  In 
addition, the interaction between gender and conviction mode proved to be a good 
predictor of sentence.  Being female results in a lower sentence, period; however, that 
gender reduction disappears for females convicted at trial.  The sentence for male plea 
bargainers was greater than that of their female counterparts, but both suffered increased 
prison time for not plea bargaining. 
In terms of ethnicity, only being Black yielded a significant result as did the 
interaction between being Black and quantity.  The following table illustrates a summary 
of statistically significant predicted values. 
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Table 28 
Predicting Sentence Summary _______________ 
 
         Predictor                       Additional Sentence 
 
Step 1 All Statutes, Defendants sentenced to prison 
 
 Constant          18.8 months 
 
 Trail Conviction           3.3 months 
 
Sell             7.4 months 
 
≥ 15 g           20.5 months 
 
Female         -14.5 months 
 
Female X Trial Conviction 11.4 months 
 
Black          -13.8 months 
 
Black X Sell            2.6 months 
 
Black X ≥ 15 g         10.8 months 
__________________________________________ 
 The associated effect of being convicted at trial vs. plea bargaining, selling as 
opposed to possessing narcotics, having the quantity involved be ≥ 15g not < 15g, 
gender, the interaction between being female and convicted at trial, being Black and the 
interaction effects of being Black may all be compared to a baseline sentence to obtain a 
predicted sentence based on a convict’s inclusion in a particular subgroup.  From that a 
trial tax may be calculated. 
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Table 29 
Predicting Sentence by Gender for Possession Crimes Considering Quantity______ 
           Possess < 15g                                   Possess ≥ 15g  
Plea Bargain      Male Female               Male Female 
Constant      18.8    18.8  Constant       18.8    18.8 
Female        0.0   -14.5  Female           0.0   -14.5 
Sentence      18.8      4.3  ≥ 15g        +20.5  +20.5 
      Sentence       39.3    24.8 
Trial Conviction  Male Female                       Male Female 
Constant      18.8    18.8  Constant               18.8    18.8 
Female        0.0   -14.5  Female                    0.0   -14.5 
Trial Conviction   +3.3    +3.3  Trial Conviction   +3.3    +3.3 
Female X Trial    Female X Trial 
Conviction        0.0  +11.4  Conviction        0.0  +11.4 
 
Sentence      22.1    19.0  ≥ 15g            +20.5  +20.5 
Trial Tax        3.3    14.7  Sentence               42.6    39.5 
      Trial Tax               3.3    14.7 
__________________________________________________________________ 
For plea bargained possession crimes of < 15g, males receive a sentence 14.5 
months greater than their female counterparts, 18.8 vs. 4.3 months.  For the same crime 
but involving a trial conviction, males receive a sentence 3.1 months greater than females 
in the same circumstance, 22.1 compared to 19.0 months.  By not pleading guilty, the 
female gender discount disappears.  There is, in effect, an interaction effect. 
Plea bargained possession crimes involving ≥ 15g produce similar results.  Males 
receive 39.1 compared to females’ 24.8 months, again due to the 14.5 month gender 
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discount.  For trial convictions, the comparative sentences become 42.6 months for males 
and 39.5 months for females. 
This results in a net trial tax, regardless of quantity, for men of 3.3 months.  
However, females are hit hardest as the gender discount fades away due to the trial 
conviction.  By not pleading guilty, females lose their gender discount if convicted at 
trial.  This results in a net trial tax for females of 14.7 months. 
The next table provides a similar display for sales crimes. 
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Table 30 
Predicting Sentence by Gender for Sales Crimes Considering Quantity__________ 
           Selling < 15g                                   Selling ≥ 15g  
Plea Bargain      Male Female               Male Female 
Constant      18.8    18.8  Constant       18.8    18.8 
Sell         7.4      7.4  Sell            7.4      7.4 
Female        0.0   -14.5  Female           0.0   -14.5 
Sentence      26.2     11.7  ≥ 15g        +20.5  +20.5 
      Sentence       46.7    32.2 
Trial Conviction  Male Female                       Male Female 
Constant      18.8    18.8  Constant               18.8    18.8 
Sell         7.4      7.4  Sell         7.4      7.4 
Female        0.0   -14.5  Female                    0.0   -14.5 
Trial Conviction   +3.3    +3.3  Trial Conviction   +3.3    +3.3 
Female X Trial    Female X Trial 
Conviction        0.0  +11.4  Conviction        0.0  +11.4 
 
Sentence      29.5    26.4  ≥ 15g            +20.5  +20.5 
Trial Tax        3.3    14.7  Sentence               50.0    46.9 
      Trial Tax               3.3    14.7 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
For plea bargained sales crimes of < 15g, males receive a sentence 14.5 months 
greater than their female counterparts, 26.2 vs. 11.7 months.  For the same crime but 
involving a trial conviction, males receive a sentence 3.3 months greater than females in 
the same circumstance, 29.5 compared to 26.4 months.  Again, by not pleading guilty, 
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females’ gender discount disappears.  There is, again, an interaction tax that leads to 
increased sentence. 
Plea bargained sales crimes involving ≥ 15g produce similar results.  Males 
received 46.7 compared to females’ 32.2 months, again due to the 14.5 month gender 
discount.  For trial convictions, the comparative sentences become 50.0 months for males 
and 46.9 months for females. 
This results in a net trial tax, regardless of quantity, for men of 3.3 months.  
However, females are hit hardest as the gender discount fades away due to the trial 
conviction.  By not pleading guilty, females lose their gender discount if convicted at 
trial.  This results in a net trial tax for females of 14.7 months. 
This holds true regardless of the crime’s seriousness with regards to possessing 
vs. selling and whether the quantity involved < 15 g or ≥ 15g. 
The next table provides a similar comparison but based on ethnicity.  Hispanics 
were not included as that group did not produce any statistically significant results. 
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Table 31 
Predicting Sentence by Ethnicity for Possession Crimes Considering Quantity____ 
           Possess < 15g                                   Possess ≥ 15g  
Plea Bargain  Not Black   Black                Not Black        Black_ 
Constant      18.8    18.8  Constant      18.8    18.8 
Black         0.0   -13.8  Black            0.0   -13.8 
Sentence      18.8      5.0  ≥ 15g        +20.5  +20.5 
      Sentence      39.3    25.5 
Trial 
Conviction       Not Black   Black                         Not Black      Black_   
Constant      18.8    18.8  Constant           18.8            18.8 
Trial Conviction  +3.3      +3.3  Trial Conviction +3.3           +3.3  
Black         0.0   -13.8  Black                  0.0          -13.8 
Sentence      22.1      8.3  ≥ 15g           +20.5         +20.5 
 
      Black X ≥ 15g       0.0         +10.5 
 
Trial Tax        3.3      3.3  Sentence              42.6            53.1 
      Trial Tax              3.3              3.3 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
For plea bargained possession crimes of < 15g, non-Blacks receive a sentence of 
18.8 months while Blacks received a 5.0 month sentence.  For the same crime but 
involving a trial conviction, Non Blacks receive a sentence 3.3 months greater than 
Blacks in the same circumstance, 22.1 compared to 8.3 months.  Ethnicity did not 
associate with conviction mode so the trial tax remains the same regardless of ethnicity. 
Plea bargained possession crimes involving ≥ 15g produce similar results.  Non 
Blacks received 22.1 compared to Blacks’ 8.3 months.  For trial convictions, the 
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comparative sentences become 42.6 months for non-Blacks, and 53.1 months for Blacks 
due to the interaction effect of being Black and the crime involving the larger quantity of 
≥ 15g.  There again appears to be an interaction tax.  This results in a net trial tax, 
regardless of quantity or ethnicity of 3.3 months.  Table 32 illustrates sales crimes. 
Table 32 
Predicting Sentence by Ethnicity for Sales Crimes Considering Quantity____ 
           Selling < 15g                                   Selling ≥ 15g  
Plea Bargain  Not Black   Black                Not Black        Black_ 
Constant      18.8    18.8  Constant      18.8    18.8 
Black         0.0   -13.8  Black            0.0   -13.8 
Sell       +7.4    +7.4  Sell          +7.4    +7.4 
Black X Sell        0.0    +2.6  Black X Sell   0.0    +2.6 
Sentence      26.2    15.0  ≥ 15g        +20.5  +20.5 
      Black X     
      ≥ 15g            0.0         +10.5 
      Sentence       46.7    46.0 
Trial 
Conviction       Not Black   Black                         Not Black      Black_   
Constant      18.8    18.8  Constant           18.8            18.8 
Trial Conviction  +3.3      +3.3  Trial Conviction +3.3           +3.3  
Black         0.0   -13.8  Black                  0.0          -13.8 
Sell         7.4      7.4  Sell      +7.4           +7.4 
Black X Sell        0.0    +2.6  Black X Sell          0.0          +2.6 
Sentence      29.5    18.3  ≥ 15g           +20.5         +20.5 
 
      Black X ≥ 15g       0.0         +10.5 
Trial Tax        3.3      3.3  Sentence              50.0           49.3 
      Trial Tax              3.3             3.3 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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For plea bargained sales crimes of < 15g, non-Blacks receive a sentence of 26.2 
months while Blacks received a 15.0 month sentence.  For the same crime but involving a 
trial conviction, non-Blacks receive a sentence 11.2 months greater than Blacks in the 
same circumstance, 29.5 compared to 18.3 months.  Ethnicity did not associate with 
conviction mode so the trial tax remains the same regardless of ethnicity. 
Plea bargained sales crimes involving ≥ 15g produce similar results.  Non Blacks 
received 46.7 compared to Blacks’ 35.5 months.  For trial convictions, the comparative 
sentences become 50.0 months for non Blacks and 49.3 months for Blacks due to the 
interaction effect of being Black and the crime involving the larger quantity of ≥ 15g.  
There appears to be, again, an interaction tax.  This results in a net trial tax, regardless of 
quantity or ethnicity of 3.3 months. 
 The main lesson seems to be, regardless of crime, gender or ethnicity, criminal 
defendants reap a bargain by pleading guilty.  They may otherwise face a trial tax.  
However, regardless of conviction mode there seems to be a “Black tax” but only in 
terms of the interaction between being Black and selling and then between Black and the 
crime involving ≥ 15g. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
 
This study began with the notion of a trial tax.  Though no standard definition 
exists, for the purposes of this research, the descriptions provided by Bogira (2005) who 
characterize it as, “. . . the extra punishment a defendant may face merely by virtue of 
exercising his right to trial.” and Ulmer and Bradley (2006) who declared it existed when, 
“. . . defendants are substantially penalized if they exercise their right to a jury trial and 
then lose.” were used. 
No writings were found that debated its existence; indeed, the Illinois appellate 
courts have openly discussed it.  Some, however, notably the Alabama Sentencing 
Commission, have debated its constitutionality on the grounds that utilizing a 
Constitutional right should not impair one’s liberty. 
This runs counter to the concept of plea bargaining, a legal tool affirmed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Brady vs. U.S. (1970) and Santobello vs. U.S. (1971).  If a 
defendant pleads guilty to an offense, they get a bargain in the form of a lesser sentence.  
The Court openly encouraged plea bargaining on the basis it creates a speedier court 
docket, lowers operating expenses for the courts and may indicate a defendant’s greater 
likelihood to reform via their acceptance of responsibility.  According to King (2005), the 
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U.S. Sentencing Commission openly declared that plea bargains should generate a 
“sentence discount” for acceptance of responsibility. 
Langer (2006), however, argued that plea bargaining creates de facto unilateral 
adjudication where prosecutors may solely decide guilt or innocence through coercive 
plea bargains, thus effectively denying the defendant of the right to due process.  
Finkelstein (1975) wrote of finding evidence that, “. . . pressures to plead guilty have 
been used to secure convictions that could not otherwise be obtained.”  Bibas (2004) 
noted that low income defendants may be assigned a public defender handling a large 
caseload.  Counsel for defense would have personal incentive to plea bargain the case, 
again effectively denying due process.  Regardless, Kinsley (2002) estimated that almost 
95% of all criminal cases in the U.S. are settled by plea bargaining over going to trial. 
Plea bargaining will remain in the legal landscape for sometime.  By default it 
appears the trial tax will also.  This study examined whether the trial tax existed, to a 
statistically significant degree, for cocaine and heroin crimes in Cook County, Illinois.  
This was accomplished by comparing sentences based on whether the defendant plea 
bargained or lost at trial.  It then attempted to measure that degree while controlling for 
contextual variables such as gender, ethnicity, crime seriousness, drug quantity along 
with interaction effects. 
Data and Analyses 
 Data was received from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois after 
submission of a Freedom of Information Act request.  The records of 12,786 offenders 
who plead guilty or were convicted at trial for cocaine or heroin offenses were used.  All 
subjects were initially charged in 2004, 2005 or 2006 with sentence being passed no later 
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than the end of 2007.  All information obtained remains a matter of public record 
available to anyone who requests it.  However, by request, no personal identifiers such as 
name or driver’s license number were included in the dataset. 
 Throughout this research, the single dependent variable was sentence, in months.  
Independent variables included conviction mode, whether the defendant received 
probation or not, gender, ethnicity, crime seriousness, quantity and interaction effect 
variables. 
 Chi-square tests were used in this study to check for significant associations 
between categorical variables.  Two-sample t-tests were performed to test for significant 
differences between means.  Two-way ANOVA assessments were run to examine the 
possible interaction effect of independent variables.  Finally, general linear models were 
developed in an attempt to measure any statistically significant associations. 
Discussion of Findings Related to Trial Tax Existence 
 The mean sentence for the dataset used in this study equaled 25.36 months.  
Those convicted at trial received a mean sentence of 32.17 months compared to the plea 
bargainers who received a mean sentence of 24.86 months.  That results in a 23% less 
and a statistically significant difference between groups.  The trial tax does exist in Cook 
County, Illinois as far as this dataset is concerned. 
 In her study, King (2005) found evidence of a trial tax using data from Kansas, 
Maryland, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and Washington.  Only in Washington State was 
there not a statistically significant difference between sentence and conviction modes.  
Overall, however, King found, “. . . a significant plea discount – the difference between 
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the average sentence given after a guilty verdict and the average sentence given after a 
guilty plea for the same offense . . .” 
 Ulmer and Bradley (2006) found the same effect in that, “. . . the odds of 
incarceration following a bench trial are roughly 2.2 times the odds for guilty plea, while 
a jury trial conviction has roughly 2.7 times the incarceration odds of a guilty plea.”  
They concluded that, “Overall, then, conviction by trial, especially jury trial, carries a 
meaningful additional sentencing penalty . . .” 
Discussion of Findings Related to Contextual Variables 
 This study found that gender is not associated with conviction mode but it is to 
sentence length.  Females receive a lighter sentence, period, but not so light a sentence if 
convicted at trial.  In this study, women received a trial tax of 10.4 months compared to 
4.5 months for men.  This was due, primarily, to interaction of gender and conviction 
mode.  By not pleading guilty women tended to lose their gender discount.  Johnson 
(2003) came to the conclusion that female offenders were more likely to receive a 
downward departure in their sentence than males. 
 Unlike gender, ethnicity was significantly associated with conviction mode and 
sentence but no interaction effect was found.  Blacks received a 4.5 month trial tax, the 
same as Whites, for crimes involving < 15g.  However, once the crime involved ≥ 15g, 
the trail tax for Blacks increased to 5.4 months.  Johnson found that Blacks had a 25% 
less chance of receiving a downward departure than Whites, and Hispanics were 56% less 
likely than whites to receive this benefit. 
 Comparing Blacks to Whites, this study found that Blacks were more often 
convicted of and received more hefty sentences for the more serious crime of sales.  For 
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quantity, however, more Whites than Blacks were convicted of the larger amount and 
Whites received a greater sentence than their Black, greater quantity counterparts.  This 
study discovered an interaction effect between ethnicity and quantity. 
Discussion of Findings Related to Measuring Associations 
 Females faced a trial tax of 10.4 months, compared to 4.5 months for males.  This 
was due, however, to a reduction in gender discount from 8.8 months to 2.9 months that 
came with a trial conviction.  This was due to the gender and conviction mode interaction 
effect as it related to sentence. 
 Blacks and Whites received the same trial tax of 4.5 months for crimes involving 
< 15g, regardless of whether it related to possession or sales.  Once the larger quantity of 
≥ 15g was reached, however, Blacks received a net trial tax of 5.4 months while Whites 
maintained 4.5 months.  This was due to the ethnicity and quantity interaction effect as it 
related to sentence.  The negative coefficient for Black went from 4.8 to 3.9 using this 
interaction variable. 
Limitations 
 The study is limited to heroin and cocaine crimes committed in Cook County, 
Illinois from 2004 to 2006.  The results may not be extrapolated to other crimes where a 
defendant may be more or less likely to go to trial.  Ulmer and Bradley (2006) found that 
violent crime defendants were two times more likely to go to trial than non-violent 
defendants.  Beyond that, all limitations were related to using sentence as the dependent 
variable. 
 This study made no account for a defendant’s criminal history.  Traditional 
wisdom suggests that having a criminal history would lead to a longer sentence.  
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However, Johnson (2003) found that those with more criminal experience were more 
likely to receive a shorter sentence.  Ulmer and Bradley (2006) determined that, “. . . the 
jury trial penalty decreases as the prior record score of the defendant increases.”  In spite 
of not agreeing with traditional wisdom, criminal history may be associated with sentence 
length. 
 Certain characteristics of the dataset may tend to dominate the analyses.  Most of 
the convictions were for smaller quantities, < 15g.  In addition, the dataset is dominated 
by Blacks and males. 
The R Square value for this model equaled 0.239.  This means that the model 
accounts for only 24% of the variance in the dependent variable, sentence.  There are 
other factors impacting sentence not accounted for by the linear model utilized.  Another 
study may be performed to explain that variance. 
 This dataset did not allow for determining a defendant’s socioeconomic status or 
the type of counsel they may have employed, private or public defender.  As noted by 
Bibas (2004), if they had a public defender they may be more likely to plea bargain than 
work to have charges dismissed or provide a rigorous defense at trial.  A top-notch 
defense attorney may provide expertise available only to those who can afford it. 
 There was no way in this study to account for victim characteristics that may lead 
to a stiffer sentence, i.e. if the victim was a child or elderly person.  King (2005) noted 
that some factors, relating to higher sentences, may be a judge’s emotional reaction to 
victim testimony, public scrutiny that accompanies trials, or the “human” perspective of 
the judge that going to trial demonstrates an inherent lack of remorse on the defendant’s 
part. 
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Implications and Recommendations for Future Research 
 This research will be a part of Drug Possession Impact Study by the Institute for 
Metropolitan Affairs scheduled for a late 2010 publication.  The results may be used for 
policy development related to the alleged penalization of the constitutional right to a jury 
trial. 
 It may serve as the foundation for future, larger scale research such as an Illinois 
wide study or another in Cook County but including all crimes.  A study may be 
performed to determine if public defender attorneys are more likely to have their clients 
plea bargain than private counsel. 
 In the spirit of Ulmer & Bradley (2006) and King (2005) an examination could be 
performed to study the association between criminal history and sentence.  Also using 
those same studies research could be done on the association between sentence and jury 
trial vs. bench trial sentences.  King (2005) found that, “. . . waiving a jury in favor of a 
bench trial has less consistent punishment consequences.” 
 A qualitative study interviewing judges regarding their feelings about those who 
go to trial compared to plea bargaining, in terms of accepting responsibility and remorse 
could also be performed. 
Conclusion 
 
Plea bargaining and the trial tax will not soon disappear from our legal system.  
Studies regarding their impact will inspire debate about their constitutionality and overall 
fairness.  The debate may never be settled but it appears that if a defendant is guilty and 
given the option to plea bargain, pleading guilty will be rewarded with a lighter sentence.
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APPENDIX A: 
 
GENERAL LINEAR MODELS
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The below equations represent White male plea bargainers. 
White male plea bargainer for possession of < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + e 
 
White male plea bargainer for selling < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + e 
 
White male plea bargainer for possessing ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + e 
 
White male plea bargainer for selling ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + e 
 
The below equations represent White males who were convicted at trial. 
 
White male trial convicted for possession of < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + e 
 
White male trial convicted for selling < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + e 
 
White male trial convicted for possessing ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β3)(≥ 15g) + e 
 
White male trial convicted for selling ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + e 
 
The below equations symbolize White female plea bargainers. 
White female plea bargainer for possession of < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β4)(Female) + e 
 
White female plea bargainer for selling < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β4)(Female) + (β2)(Sell) + e 
 
White female plea bargainer for possessing ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β4)(Female) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + e 
 
White female plea bargainer for selling ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β4)(Female) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)(≥ 15g) + e 
 
The below equations correspond to White females who were convicted at trial. 
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White female plea bargainer for possession of < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β4)(Female) + e 
 
White female plea bargainer for selling < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β4)(Female) + (β2)(Sell) + e 
 
White female plea bargainer for possessing ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β4)(Female) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + e 
 
White female plea bargainer for selling ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β4)(Female) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)(≥ 15g) + e 
 
The below equations represent Black male plea bargainers. 
Black male plea bargainer for possession of < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β6)(Black) + e 
 
Black male plea bargainer for selling < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β6)(Black) + (β8)(Black * Sell) + e 
 
Black male plea bargainer for possessing ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β6)(Black) + (β10)(Black * ≥  15g) + e 
 
Black male plea bargainer for selling ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β6)(Black) + (β8)(Black * Sell) + (β10)(Black * ≥  
15g) + e 
 
The below equations characterize Black males who were convicted at trial. 
 
Black male trial convicted for possession of < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β6)(Black) + e 
 
Black male trial convicted for selling < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β6)(Black) + (β8)(Black * Sell) + e 
 
Black male trial convicted for possessing ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β3)(≥ 15g) + (β6)(Black) + (β10)(Black * ≥  15g) + e 
 
Black male trial convicted for selling ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β6)(Black) + (β8)(Black * 
Sell) + (β10)(Black * ≥  15g) + e 
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The below models correspond to Black female plea bargainers. 
Black female plea bargainer for possession of < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + (β6)(Black) + e 
 
Black female plea bargainer for selling < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + (β6)(Black) + 
(β8)(Black * Sell) + e 
 
Black female plea bargainer for possessing ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + (β6)(Black) + 
(β10)(Black * ≥  15g) + e 
 
Black female plea bargainer for selling ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + 
(β6)(Black) + (β8)(Black * Sell) + (β10)(Black * ≥  15g) + e 
 
The below models correspond to Black females convicted at trial. 
Black female trial convicted for possession of < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + 
(β6)(Black) + e 
 
Black female trial convicted for selling < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + 
(β2)(Sell) + (β6)(Black) + (β8)(Black * Sell) + e 
 
Black female trial convicted for possessing ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β3)(≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial 
Conviction) + (β6)(Black) + (β10)(Black * ≥  15g) + e 
 
Black female trial convicted for selling ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female 
* Trial Conviction) (β6)(Black) + (β8)(Black * Sell) + (β10)(Black * ≥  15g) + e 
 
The below equations represent Hispanic male plea bargainers. 
Hispanic male plea bargainer for possession of < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β7)(Hispanic) + e 
 
Hispanic male plea bargainer for selling < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + e 
 
Hispanic male plea bargainer for possessing ≥ 15g: 
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Y’ = β0 + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β11)(Hispanic * ≥  15g) + e 
 
Hispanic male plea bargainer for selling ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + 
(β11)(Hispanic * ≥  15g) + e 
 
The below equations represent Hispanic males who were convicted at trial. 
Hispanic male trial convicted for possession of < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β7)(Hispanic) + e 
 
Hispanic male trial convicted for selling < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + e 
 
Hispanic male trial convicted for possessing ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β3)(≥ 15g) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β11)(Hispanic * ≥  
15g) + e 
 
Hispanic male trial convicted for selling ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β7)(Hispanic) + 
(β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + (β11)(Hispanic * ≥  15g) + e 
 
The below models characterize Hispanic female plea bargainers. 
Hispanic female plea bargainer for possession of < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + (β7)(Hispanic) + e 
 
Hispanic female plea bargainer for selling < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + (β7)(Hispanic) + 
(β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + e 
 
Hispanic female plea bargainer for possessing ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + (β7)(Hispanic) 
+ (β11)(Hispanic * ≥  15g) + e 
 
Hispanic female plea bargainer for selling ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + 
(β7)(Hispanic) + (β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + (β11)(Hispanic * ≥  15g) + e 
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The below models characterize Hispanic females convicted at trial. 
 
Hispanic female trial convicted for possession of < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + 
(β7)(Hispanic) + e 
 
Hispanic female trial convicted for selling < 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial 
Conviction) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + e 
 
Hispanic female trial convicted for possessing ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β3)(≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial 
Conviction) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β11)(Hispanic * ≥  15g) + e 
 
Hispanic female trial convicted for selling ≥ 15g: 
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female 
* Trial Conviction) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + (β11)(Hispanic * ≥  15g) + 
e 
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